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Section 1031(a)(1) 1 provides an exception to the general rule
that gain and loss must be recognized on the sale or exchange of
property.2 To qualify for nonrecognition under section 1031(a)(1),
I I.R.C. § 1031(a)(1)(2001).
2 See I.R.C. § 1001(c) for the general rule requiring recognition.
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the transaction must meet four requirements: (1) there must be an
exchange, (2) the property the taxpayer receives must be of a like
kind to the property the taxpayer transfers, (3) the taxpayer must hold
both properties for use in a trade or business or for investment, and
(4) the properties cannot be disqualified under section 1031(a)(2).
Courts have held that section 1031(a)(1) applies to exchanges involv-
ing multiple parties if the exchange is structured properly. 3  The
Ninth Circuit and Congress also have provided that section
1031(a)(1) applies even though the taxpayer transfers relinvuished
property some time before receiving replacement property, com-
monly known as deferred exchanges. 5 By holding that exchanges
involving multiple parties and deferred exchanges qualify for section
1031 treatment, the courts and Congress have provided taxpayers
with various exchange structures to use to avoid gain recognition
when exchanging property for other property of a like kind. Al-
though the structures that are currently allowed are helpful, more
guidance is needed.
B. The Reverse Exchange Issues
A taxpayer may locate replacement property that it wishes to
acquire currently at a favorable price while deferring the transfer of
the relinquished property to a time when, hopefully, a better price can
be obtained.6 A transaction such as this, in which the taxpayer re-
ceives replacement property before the taxpayer transfers relin-
quished property, is known as a reverse exchange.7 Section 1031
3 See infra Part II.B.2 for an in depth discussion of judicial decisions that
allow section 1031 (a)(1) treatment to taxpayers who enter into transactions involv-
ing multiple parties.
4 Starker v. United States, 602 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1979); see also I.R.C. §
1031(a)(3)(2001).
5 Like-kind Exchanges - Limitations on Deferred Exchanges; and Inapplica-
bility of Section 1031 to Exchanges of Partnership Interests, 56 Fed. Reg. 19,933
(May 1, 1991) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1) (Preamble to the Regulations).
6 Section of Taxation American Bar Association, ABA Members Urge IRS
Guidance on Reverse Exchanges, TAx NOTES TODAY (Jan. 7, 1993)(LEXIS,
FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 93 TNT 4-52).
7 Ronald C. Stasch, Stasch Urges Tax-free Treatment for Reverse 'Starker'
Exchanges, TAX NOTES TODAY (July 26,1990)(LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file,
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does not provide any specific guidance regarding whether gain or
loss must be recognized when a taxpayer enters into a reverse ex-
change. In 1991, the Treasury Department (Treasury) promulgated
regulations that apply to deferred exchanges. 8  At that time, the
Treasury specifically stated that those regulations would not apply to
reverse exchanges. 9 For many years there has been no specific guid-
ance regarding reverse exchanges; therefore, Amany taxpayers
[were] unwilling to do them directly because of concerns that the
[Internal Revenue Service would] challenge whether such transac-
tions qualify for nonrecognition under [section] 1031. Consequently,
most reverse exchanges occur through the use of cumbersome (and
costly) parking or lease-option arrangements.' 0
In a recently-published revenue procedure, the Internal Reve-
nue Service (Service) responded to pleas from tax practitioners and,
at long last, published guidance in this area." The revenue proce-
dure published by the Service provides a safe harbor for taxpayers
who wish to use parking arrangements, but does not address reverse
exchange structures that do not involve parking arrangements. 12 Al-
though the revenue procedure is helpful to taxpayers, it leaves several
issues unresolved. Furthermore, taxpayers should be given additional
guidance regarding pure reverse exchanges.
elec. cit., 90 TNT 155-40).
8 See supra note 5.
9 Id.
10 Section of Taxation American Bar Association, supra note 6. See infra
Parts II. C and D for an in-depth discussion of parking arrangements.
II Rev. Proc. 2000-37, 2000-40 I.R.B. 308; see also Tech. Adv. Mem 00-39-
005 (May 31, 2000) (Published September 29, 2000). The Service took the posi-
tion that an exchange accommodator was an agent of the taxpayer and that a trans-
fer made to the exchange accommodator should be treated as a transfer to the tax-
payer. Id. The Service did not allow like-kind exchange treatment to the taxpayer in
this situation because it found that the taxpayer through its agent received the re-
placement property and later transferred the relinquished property in a separate
non-interdependent purchase and sale transaction. Id.
12 Rev. Proc. 2000-37, 2000-40 I.R.B. 308.
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C. Applying Section 1031 Principles to Reverse Exchanges
1. Reverse Exchanges and Section 1031 Purpose and Requirements
Taxpayers should not have to resort to using parking or lease-
option arrangements if reverse exchanges can be structured in a man-
ner that clearly satisfies the purpose and meets the requirements of
section 1031. In enacting the like-kind exchange provisions, Con-
gress eliminated administrative inconvenience associated with valu-
ing replacement property and deferred recognition of gain or loss
associated with an investment until a taxpayer discontinued the in-
vestment. As will be shown, properly structured reverse exchanges
satisfy this intent. The only other issue is whether a transaction
structured as a reverse exchange can meet the section 1031 exchange
requirement (assuming the other two section 1031 requirements are
met). 13 An analysis of the legislative history, judicial decisions, and
the Treasury Regulations reveals that the exchange requirement of
section 1031 can be broken down into two components: (1) a re-
quirement that there be a property-for-property transfer and (2) that
the transfer be reciprocal.' 4 The application of these principles to
reverse exchanges reveals that three different structures can be used
to effectuate a reverse exchange that, if completed within a reason-
able time, will satisfy the purpose and meet the exchange require-
ment of section 1031. The three types of structures are: a two-party
reverse exchange, a three-corner reverse exchange, and a four-corner
reverse exchange.
2. The Service Should Publish Additional Guidance
Although these three types of exchanges, when properly
structured and completed in a reasonable time, satisfy the purpose
and exchange requirements of section 1031, taxpayers may be un-
willing to use them until they are more certain that the Service will
13 This paper assumes that the other two requirements of section 1031 are
satisfied in each example discussed herein.
14 I.R.C. § 1031 (2001)
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not challenge the structures. In publishing Rev. Proc. 2000-37, the
Service has provided a safe harbor for taxpayers wishing to use park-
ing arrangements, but has failed to provide any guidance on true re-
verse like-kind exchanges. Therefore, the Service should publish
guidance stating that it will not challenge whether the three types of
reverse exchanges identified herein qualify for like-kind exchange
treatment if they are structured correctly.' 5
This article discusses the current regulatory treatment of like-
kind exchanges and the need for guidance for the use of reverse ex-
changes. Part I introduces section 1031 of the Code, reverse ex-
change issues, and the application of section 1031 to reverse ex-
changes. Part II fully examines the principles and requirements of
like-kind exchanges. Part III identifies the issues of regulating re-
verse exchanges and evaluates proposals and published guidance for
the treatment of reverse exchanges. Finally, Part IV presents the ul-
timate conclusion that more guidance is necessary for taxpayers to
comfortably and successfully engage in reverse exchanges.
II. EXISTING PRINCIPLES OF LIKE-KIND EXCHANGES
A. The Purpose of Section 1031
The beginning point in analyzing whether section 1031
should apply to reverse exchanges is to clearly determine what Con-
gress intended in enacting the like-kind exchange provisions. Con-
gress first granted tax-deferred treatment to taxpayers exchanging
like-kind property in 1921.16 The Revenue Act of 1921 provided:
15 Barton Massey, Safe Harbor Guidance For Reverse Like-Kind Exchanges to
Come Soon, IRS Official Promises, TAX NOTES TODAY (Jan. 25, 2000)(LEXIS,
FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2000 TNT 16-2). On January 22, 2000, Kelly
Alton, special counsel to the assistant chief counsel, income tax and accounting,
told the American Bar Association Section on Taxation that she expected the Ser-
vice to issue guidance on reverse exchanges during 2000. Id. Rev. Proc. 2000-37 is
a fulfillment of this expectation, but the guidance is limited to exchanges involving
parking arrangements. 2000 I.R.B 308.
16 Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 202(c), 42 Stat. 227, 230.
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For the purposes of this title, on an exchange of prop-
erty, real, personal or mixed, for any other such prop-
erty, no gain or loss shall be recognized unless the
property received in exchange has a readily realizable
market value; but even if the property received in ex-
change has a readily realizable market value, no gain
or loss shall be recognized (1) [w]hen any such prop-
erty held for investment, or for productive use in a
trade or business (not including stock-in-trade or other
property held primarily for sale), is exchanged for
17property of a like kind or use ....
The readily realizable market value language led one court to
believe that one of the purposes for enacting this statute was the ad-
ministrative inconvenience created by trying to determine the market
value of an asset. 18 Indeed, the legislative history referring to the
market value language states that no part of the present income-tax
law has been productive of so much uncertainty and litigation or has
more seriously interfered with those business readjustments which
are peculiarly necessary under existing conditions. 19 Congress be-
lieved that by excepting like-kind exchanges from gain and loss rec-
ognition it would be are moving a source of grave uncertainty [and
would] permit business to go forward with the readjustments required
by existing conditions .... 20 The discussion in the House of Repre-
sentatives also provides that the 1921 Act relieves such transactions
from delay, simplifies the tax return, and promotes such exchange of
property. 21 In excepting like-kind exchanges from the general recog-
nition rules, Congress believed that it would eliminate some incon-
venience for both taxpayers and the Service.
17 Id.
18 Century Elec. Co. v. Commissioner, 192 F.2d 155, 159 (8th Cir. 1951).
19 H.R. REP. No. 67-350, at 10 (1921); see also S. REP. No. 67-275, at 11
(1921).
20 H.R. REP. No. 67-350, at 10 (1921); see also S. REP. No. 67-275, at 11
(1921).
21 61 CONG. REc. 5201 (1921).
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In 1924 the readily realizable market value language was re-
moved from the statute. 22 The report from the House Committee on
Ways and Means stated:
The provision is so indefinite that it cannot be applied
with accuracy or with consistency. It appears best to
provide generally that gain or loss is recognized from
all exchanges, and then except specifically and in
definite terms those cases of exchanges in which it is
not desired to tax the gain or allow the loss. This re-
sults in definiteness and accuracy and enables a tax-
payer to determine prior to the consummation of a
given transaction the tax liability that will result.23
This statement shows that, by removing the readily realizable
market value language from the statute, Congress made it clear that it
was concerned about the problems associated with trying to deter-
mine the value of property received in a transaction. This change,
along with the change excepting like-kind exchanges from the gen-
eral recognition rule, provides clear evidence that one purpose Con-
gress had in enacting the like-kind exchange provisions was to re-
move some inconvenience that would otherwise arise.
Congress also determined that a taxpayer should not pay taxes
24until gain or loss is realized in cash. This purpose is made evident
by the committee report from the House Committee on Ways and
Means. That committee, in 1934, stated:
[I]f the taxpayer's money is still tied up in the same
kind of property as that in which it was originally in-
vested, he is not allowed to compute and deduct his
theoretical loss on the exchange, nor is he charged
with a tax upon his theoretical profit. The calculation
of the profit or loss is deferred until it is realized in
22 Act of March 4, 1923, ch. 294, 1, 42 Stat. 1560.
23 H.R. REP. No. 68-179, at 13 (1924).
24 H.R. REP. No. 73-704, at 13 (1934).
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cash, marketable securities, or other property not of
the same kind having a fair market value.
2
The court in Jordan Marsh Co. v. Commissioner26 accepted
this statement as Congress' true intent for providing tax-deferred
treatment to like-kind exchanges. The court stated that, in enacting
the like-kind exchange provisions, Congress was primarily concerned
with the inequity, in the case of an exchange, of forcing a taxpayer to
recognize a paper gain which was still tied up in a continuing invest-
ment of the same sort.27 The court also stated that "[tihese considera-
tions, rather than concern for the difficulty of the administrative task
of making the valuations necessary to compute gains and losses, were
at the root of the Congressional purpose. . . ." Although Congress
was concerned about administrative convenience in enacting the like-
kind exchange provisions, it appears that its primary purpose was to
defer recognition of gain or loss until a taxpayer actually terminated
an investment. In analyzing whether reverse exchanges should be
granted section 1031 treatment, both of these purposes should be
considered. If a taxpayer decides to continue an investment by re-
placing one property with another property and does so through a
reverse exchange, the exchange should qualify for tax-deferred
treatment if all the other requirements of section 1031 are met.
B. The Exchange Requirement
To receive like-kind exchange treatment, a transaction must
meet the requirements in section 1031. The 1924 Act provided that
four requirements must be-met for a transaction to qualify as a like-
kind exchange. 29 Other than a few minor changes in wording, the
general rule in the 1924 Act remains unchanged in our current stat-
ute.30 The four requirements are: (1) that there be an exchange, (2)
25 Id.
26 269 F.2d 453, 456 (2d Cir. 1959).
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 203(b)(1), 43 Stat. 253, 256.
30 The Revenue Act of 1928 made minor language revisions and changed the
section number to 112(b). In 1954, the number was changed to § 1031(a).
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that the property received in the exchange be of a like kind to the
property transferred, (3) that both the property the taxpayer transfers
and the property the taxpayer receives be held for use in a trade or
business or for investment, and (4) that neither the property the tax-
payer transfers nor the property the taxpayer receives is a disqualified
asset.31 Of the three requirements, the most important question in
analyzing reverse exchanges is whether an exchange has occurred.
For purposes of this article, all the properties involved will be as-
sumed to be of a like kind and held by the taxpayer for use in a trade
or business or for investment.
Today, a large body of law exists that deals with the defini-
tion of exchange for purposes of section 103 1.32 The evolution of
this body of law seems to have begun during a now-famous floor dis-
cussion between Congressman Green, who was then Chairman of the
House Committee on Ways and Means, and Congressman La
Guardia. 33 The pertinent portion of the discussion went as follows:
La Guardia: Under this paragraph is it necessary to
exchange property? Suppose the property is sold and
other property immediately acquired for the same
business. Would that be a gain or loss, assuming there
is greater value in the property acquired? ...
Green: If the property is reduced to cash and there is
a gain, of course it will be taxed.
La Guardia: Suppose that cash is immediately put
back into the property, into the business?
Green: That would not make any difference. 34
31 I.R.C. § 103 1(a)(1), (a)(2)(2001).
32 See infra Part II.B. through E. for a discussion of the body of law that ad-
dresses the definition of exchange for purposes of section 103 1(a)(1).
33 65 CONG. REC. 2799 (1924).
34 Id.
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This discussion clearly provides evidence showing that to
qualify for tax-deferred treatment under the like-kind exchange pro-
visions, Congress intended that the taxpayer exchange property for
property, not property for cash. Therefore, the receipt of cash for
property will cause a transfer to fail to meet the exchange require-
ment of section 1031. As will be seen, this conclusion is supported
by the regulations and numerous court decisions.
Treas. Reg. 1.1002-1(d) states that "to constitute an exchange,
the transaction must be a reciprocal transfer of property, as distin-
guished from a transfer of property for a money consideration
only." 35 The comments by Congressman Green and the language in
the regulations provide two elements that must be present for an ex-
change to occur: (1) the taxpayer must transfer property and receive
property (hereinafter "property-for-property" requirement) and (2)
the transfer must be reciprocal (hereinafter "reciprocal" requirement).
Courts have been very strict in construing the property-for-property
requirement.36 In construing the reciprocal requirement, courts have
developed both narrow and broad standards. Courts require a tax-
payer to transfer property to and receive property from one, and only
one, exchange partner, but allow taxpayers to structure such sole ex-
changes in many different ways in order to achieve a reciprocal trans-
fer. 3
7
1. The Property-for-Property Requirement
The current regulations provide that "exceptions from the
general rule requiring the recognition of all gains and losses ... are
strictly construed and do not extend either beyond the words or the
underlying assumptions and purposes of the exception." 38 Since sec-
tion 1031 is an exception to the general rule requiring recognition of
gains and losses, it should be strictly construed. Perhaps the most
35 Treas. Reg. § 1.1002-1(d) (1957).
36 See e.g. Carlton v. United States, 385 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1967); Halpern v.
United States, 286 F.Supp. 255 (N.D. Ga. 1968).
37 See e.g. Mercantile Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 32 B.T.A. 82 (1935); W.D.
Haden v. Commissioner, 165 f.2d 588 (5th Cir. 1948); Biggs v. Commissioner, 632
F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1980).
38 Treas. Reg. § 1.1002-1(b) (1957).
670 Virginia Tax Review [Vol. 20:659
poignant example of a court strictly construing the property-for-
property requirement can be found in Carlton v. United States.39 In
Carlton, the taxpayer owned ranch land located in Florida.40 The
taxpayer entered into a contract with General providing General with
an option to purchase the ranch land from the taxpayer for a specified
price. The contract also provided that the taxpayer could require
General to acquire other land as designated by the taxpayer and trans-
fer the other land to the taxpayer in lieu of a cash payment or mort-
gage.42 The taxpayer subsequently found two other properties (Ly-
ons and Fernandez) suitable for the purpose of exchange. 43 General
entered into a contract to purchase Lyons and Fernandez. 44 The tax-
payer intended to use Lyons and Fernandez to continue the ranching
activities for which the ranch land was used.45
On August 3, the date of closing, the taxpayer transferred the
ranch land to General.46 As consideration for the taxpayer's ranch
land, General transferred to the taxpayer the cash needed to purchase
Lyons and Fernandez, and assigned its rights to purchase such prop-
erty to the taxpayer.47 On that same day, the taxpayer used a portion
of the funds to purchase Lyons. 48 On the following day, the taxpayer
used the remaining portion of the funds to purchase Fernandez. 49
In deciding whether the transaction qualified for like-kind ex-
change treatment, the court stated that "[t]he only question presented
here is whether the transfer of the properties constituted a sale or an
exchange." 5° The court then recognized that although the taxpayer
did indeed continue ranching after the exchange (satisfying the con-
tinuation-of-an-investment purpose of section 1031), that aspect of
39 385 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1967).




44 Id. at 240.
45 Id. at 239.




50 Id. at 241.
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the transaction did not control. 51 The court stated that "it is well set-
tled that a sale and repurchase do not qualify for nonrecognition
treatment under [section 1031] 2 and that it could not close [its] eyes
to the realities of the transaction. 53 The court made it clear that each
step of the transaction, not merely the beginning and the end, must be
considered.54 Looking at each step, the court concluded that the tax-
payer received cash as consideration for the ranch land, and that the
taxpayer in turn purchased the Lyons and Fernandez properties. 55 In
arriving at this decision, the court relied upon the fact that the money
transferred to the taxpayer was not earmarked by the exchange part-
ner to be used exclusively to purchase the Lyons and Fernandez
properties and that the taxpayer had unfettered and unrestrained use
of the proceeds.
56
The Carlton decision provides an excellent example of how
strictly courts will construe the property-for-property requirement in
determining whether a transaction qualifies as an exchange for pur-
poses of section 1031. In Carlton, the taxpayer's intent to continue
an investment was clear; however, that intent did not influence the
court's decision. 57 In making its decision, the court focused on the
fact that the taxpayer actually received cash instead of property from
the exchange partner. 58 Once the court concluded the taxpayer had
actually received cash, it would not be influenced by either the tax-
payer's intent nor the substance of the transaction. 5 9 After reading
Carlton, it is apparent that in structuring reverse exchanges, taxpay-
ers must be very careful to ensure that money is not received or trans-
ferred in such a way that the transaction fails to meet the property-
for-property requirement.
The district court for the Northern District of Georgia held





55 Id. at 242.
56 Id. at 243.
57 Id.
5S Id. at 242-43.
59 Id. at 243.
672 Virginia Tax Review [Vol. 20:659
ment even though the taxpayer does not actually receive money.6° In
Halpern v. United States, the taxpayers were involved in an exchange
that involved multiple parties. 61 Ultimately, the taxpayers transferred
property and received other property and cash.62 To get to the end
result, the taxpayers transferred their property to Chennault. 63 In ex-
change, Chennault transferred property to the taxpayers and trans-
ferred cash to the Lawyers Title Insurance Company (Lawyers Ti-
tle).64 Lawyers Title used the cash it received from Chennault to pur-
chase replacement property for the taxpayers.
65
In deciding that the transaction did not qualify for like-kind
exchange treatment, the court stated that "the failure to actually re-
ceive the cash does not automatically require a corollary finding that
a transaction is an exchange." 66 The court stated that since the tax-
payers did not have to use the proceeds transferred to Lawyers Title
to purchase the replacement property, but could actually receive the
proceeds and use them as they please (i.e. the taxpayers' use of the
proceeds was unfettered and unrestricted), the decision in Carlton
should apply.67  Therefore, the court held that the taxpayers had
failed to satisfy the property-for-property requirement and conse-68 •"l
quently would not receive section 1031 treatment. This case illus-
trates that a transaction in which a taxpayer constructively receives
cash will not meet the property-for-property requirement.
Although the results in these two cases seem somewhat harsh,
the principle is followed in numerous other cases. 69 The results from
these cases provide clear guidance to taxpayers: if the taxpayer re-
ceives cash (actually or constructively) in a transaction instead of




64 Id. at 258.
65 Id. at 258- 259.
66 Id. at 258.
67 Id. at 259.
68 Id.
69 See, e.g., Trenton Cotton Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 147 F.2d 33, 36 (6th
Cir. 1945); Barker v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 555 (1980); Rogers v. Commis-
sioner, 44 T.C. 126 (1965) affid. per curiam, 377 F.2d 534 (9th Cir. 1967).
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property, the transaction does not satisfied the property-for-property
requirement. Therefore, such a transaction will not qualify as an ex-
change for purposes of section 1031. For a reverse exchange to sat-
isfy the property-for-property requirement, the taxpayer should avoid
receiving cash from one of the parties involved in the transaction and
must also be cautious about transferring cash to a seller.
2. The Reciprocal Requirement
Although courts strictly construe the property-for-property
requirement, they have been lenient in allowing taxpayers to find
ways to satisfy the reciprocal requirement even though multiple par-
ties are involved.70  A look at cases involving multiple parties in
which the courts have held that the transaction qualifies for like-kind
exchange treatment, one common element exists: even though multi-
ple parties are involved the courts have been able to find in each case
that the taxpayer transferred property to one party and received re-
placement property from that same party.71 In some instances, courts
disregard the passage of title and look at the flow of rights connected
to the property.72 In such cases, the courts have found that if the tax-
payer transfers rights to one other party and receives rights from that
same party, the reciprocal requirement is met.73 Thus, it appears that
a taxpayer will meet the reciprocal requirement if the taxpayer actu-
ally transfers property (either in the form of a set of rights or rights
and legal title) to one other party and receives replacement property
(either in the form of a set of rights or in the form of rights and legal
title) from the same party. If the taxpayer can establish that the trans-
fer was with only one other party, courts allow the taxpayer to use
various structures to complete the exchange. This rule is illustrated
by the following cases.
70 See, e.g., Mercantile Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 32 B.T.A. 82 (1935); W.D.
Haden v. Commissioner, 165 F.2d 588 (5th Cir. 1948).
71 See, e.g., W.D. Haden v. Commissioner, 165 F.2d 588 (5th Cir. 1948).




Mercantile Trust Co. v. Commissioner74 is an example of how
the courts allow taxpayers to structure transactions involving multiple
parties in a manner that meets the reciprocal requirement. In Mer-
cantile Trust, Emerson Hotel desired to purchase property (the Bal-
timore Street property) owned by the taxpayer. 75 The taxpayer did
not want to enter into a cash sale of the Baltimore Street property, so
it required the Title Company, acting as Emerson Hotel's agent, to
purchase the Lexington Street property from an independent third
party and transfer it to the taxpayer in exchange for the Baltimore
Street property.76 The Board of Tax Appeals held that the taxpayer
actually entered into an agreement with the Title Company in which
the taxpayer was obligated to transfer the Baltimore Street property
to the Title Company and could compel the Title Company to trans-
fer the Lexington Street property to the taxpayer.77 The Board found
that the taxpayer and the Title Company carried the contract out ac-
cording to their agreement and held that in so doing, effected an ex-78
change that qualified for like-kind exchange treatment. This deci-
sion demonstrates that a taxpayer can structure a transaction involv-
ing multiple parties in such a manner that the end result will produce
an exchange between only two parties and satisfy the reciprocal re-
quirement.
In 1948, the Fifth Circuit, in W.D. Haden v. Commissioner,79
provided taxpayers even more flexibility with which they could
structure exchanges that would satisfy the reciprocal requirement.
The exchange in Haden involved four parties: the taxpayer, Haden
Co., which owned lot No. 16; Beeley, who owned lot No. 15; Texas
Co., which owned lot No. 17; and Goodwin, an independent real es-
tate man who acted as intermediary to facilitate the transaction. 80
The only contract signed by the taxpayer was with Goodwin, agree-
74 32 B.T.A. 82 (1935).
75 Id. at 83-84.
76 Id. at 83, 85.
77 Id. at 85.
78 Id. at 87, 88.
79 165 F.2d 588 (5th Cir. 1948).
80 Id. at 590.
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ing to exchange No. 16 for No. 17 with no money consideration.
81
Goodwin had also entered into contracts with Beeley and Texas Co.
to ensure that the taxpayer would receive lot No. 17.82 To effectuate
the agreement between the taxpayer and Goodwin, Goodwin re-
quested that Texas Co. convey lot No. 17 to the taxpayer and the tax-
payer convey lot No. 16 to Beeley (Beeley also transferred cash to
Goodwin as part of the agreement). 83 The court held that this trans-
action qualified for like-kind exchange treatment. 84 In so holding,
the court stated that the "[t]axpayer simply carried out the contract it
had made with Goodwin by conveying at Goodwin's direction to an-
other. [The] [t]axpayer did not sell to Beeley or get any of his
money. It exchanged its lot for another one.85 In finding that an ex-
change had occurred, this court did not require the actual title to pass
to or from only one person. 86 The court did, however, note that the
taxpayer had only one exchange partner B Goodwin.87 The other
parties entered into contracts with Goodwin, not with the taxpayer.
88
Thus, the reciprocal requirement is met when the taxpayer transfers
and receives legal title to property from different parties if the tax-
payer is carrying out obligations and receiving benefits from a con-
tract made with only one exchange partner.
In 1963, two different circuit courts held that other transac-
tions involving multiple parties can qualify as exchanges. 89 The first
of the two cases to be decided was Alderson v. Commissioner.90 In
Alderson, the taxpayer entered into an agreement on May 21, 1957
with Alloy to sell Buena Park to Alloy for cash. 91 Sometime after









89 Alderson v. Commissioner, 317 F.2d 790 (9th Cir. 1963); Coastal Termi-
nals, Inc. v. United States, 320 F.2d 333 (4th Cir. 1963).
90 Alderson v. Commissioner, 317 F.2d 790 (9th Cir. 1963).
91 Id. at 791.
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Salinas property and decided it would be better to exchange the
Buena Park property for the Salinas property.92 On August 19, 1957,
the taxpayer and Alloy amended their original agreement to provide
that Alloy would acquire the Salinas Property and transfer the Salinas
property to the taxpayer in exchange for Buena Park.93 The amended
agreement also provided that if Alloy was unable to transfer the
Salinas property to the taxpayer by September 11, 1957, Alloy would
purchase Buena Park for cash.94
As part of the agreement, Alloy transferred money to an es-
crow which acquired the deed to the Salinas property and then trans-
ferred the Salinas deed to Alloy.95 In the end, the taxpayer deeded
the Buena Park property to Alloy on August 26, 1957 and received a
deed for the Salinas property from Alloy on August 29, 1957.96 The
court held that this final transfer between the taxpayer and Alloy
qualified as an exchange of like-kind property.9 7 This decision ex-
pands a taxpayer's ability to structure a reciprocal transfer by allow-
ing taxpayers to amend agreements that originally called for cash
consideration into agreements requiring an exchange of like-kind
property. The decision also states that a default clause requiring the
exchange partner to transfer cash in the event that it cannot obtain
and transfer like-kind property does not violate the property-for-
property requirement.
Another case involving multiple parties was Coastal Tenni-
nals, Inc. v. United States, decided in 1963.98 In that case, the tax-
payer, Coastal Terminals, decided to dispose of its deepwater oil ter-
minal and acquire inland terminals.99 Pursuant to this plan, the tax-
payer acquired options to purchase three sites on which it could con-
struct inland terminal facilities. 1°° Because steel was in short supply,






97 Id. at 795.
98 320 F.2d 333 (4th Cir. 1963).
99 Id. at 334.
1o Id.
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Iron Company for steel that it would need to construct the terminal
facilities.' Shortly thereafter, Delhi-Taylor offered to purchase the
taxpayer's deepwater terminal. 10 2 Delhi-Taylor was unwilling to pay
the cash price that the taxpayer was asking, so it proposed that the
two parties enter into an agreement whereby Delhi-Taylor would ob-
tain the inland sites on which the taxpayer held options, construct the
necessary facilities, and then transfer the inland terminals to the tax-
payer in exchange for the taxpayer's deepwater terminal. 10 3 The
agreement also provided that in the event that Delhi-Taylor was un-
able to consummate the exchange that it would pay cash for the
deepwater terminal.l°4
The transaction was carried out as agreed: the taxpayer as-
signed the options on the three inland sites and the steel commitment
to Delhi-Taylor, Delhi-Taylor constructed the inland terminal facili-
ties, and then transferred the inland terminals to the taxpayer in ex-
change for the deepwater terminal. 105 In holding that the transaction
qualified as an exchange, the court stated that the transaction should
not be separated into each component, but should be looked at as a
whole. 1°6 The court saw that the taxpayer exchanged the deepwater
terminal for the inland terminals, qualifying as an exchange. 107 The
court also was able to once again find a reciprocal transfer had oc-
curred even though Delhi-Taylor obtained options to purchase the
inland sites from the taxpayer.
The facts in Biggs v. Commissioner108 are even more compli-
cated, but the result is the same. The taxpayer, Biggs, desired to
transfer his Maryland property (the Maryland Rproperty) for a piece of
property in Virginia (the Virginia property).' ° 9 To accomplish this
task, the owner of the Virginia property transfer title to Shore Title
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 334-35.
104 Id. at 335.
105 Id. at 335-336.106 Id. at 335-336.
107 Id. at 339.
108 632 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1980).
109 Id. at 1172-73.
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Company (Shore Title). 110 The taxpayer advanced approximately
$115,000 to Shore Title to enable it to acquire title to the property.'1
Shore Title then entered into an agreement with Powell whereby
Shore Title agreed to sell the Virginia property to Powell or Powell's
assigns.112 Powell and the taxpayer then entered into an agreement
whereby Powell would transfer the rights in the Virginia property to
the taxpayer in exchange for the taxpayer transferring the rights in
the Maryland property to Powell.' 1 3 Powell subsequently transferred
the rights in the Maryland property to the Lessanses, who transferred
the rights to Ocean View. 1 R Then Shore Title executed a deed to the
Virginia property to the taxpayer, and the taxpayer executed a deed to
the Maryland property to Ocean View.
115
Although this transaction is very complicated and involved
many different parties, the court held that an exchange did occur.'
16
In making this decision, the court reiterated the fact that the exchange
partner (in this case Powell) was not required to receive title to the
property being transferred to the taxpayer for the transaction to qual-
ify as an exchange. 117 Powell's receipt of the rights to the Virginia
property and transfer of such rights to the taxpayer was sufficient to
satisfy the exchange requirement. 11s The court also stated that the
"the ultimate transfers of the Maryland and Virginia properties were
part of a single, integrated plan, the substantive result of which was a
like-kind exchange." 119 This decision created greater leniency for
meeting the reciprocal requirement by allowing the taxpayer to ad-
vance the cash that was used to purchase the replacement property,
and by allowing the taxpayer to be involved in the acquisition of the
replacement property and still be allowed like-kind exchange treat-
ment.
110 Id. at 1173.




115 Id. at 1175.
116 Id. at 1178.
117 Id. at 1177.
119 Id. at 1178.
119 Id.
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The decisions in these cases demonstrate that although the
courts require a reciprocal exchange, taxpayers can employ different
techniques to create a reciprocal exchange. In effect, the exchange in
each of these cases was between two parties, one of whom had, in his
own manner, previously acquired property which was to be subse-
quently exchanged with that of the taxpayer. 120 Although a court
made this comment before some of the cases mentioned above were
decided, the comment is an excellent statement of the reciprocal re-
quirement. If a taxpayer can structure a transaction in such a manner
that an exchange occurs between the taxpayer and one other party
(the exchange partner), the reciprocal requirement will be met. As
seen above, the reciprocal requirement does not mandate that legal
title pass through the hands of the exchange partner so long as the
taxpayer and the exchange partner exchange rights in the properties.
If the taxpayer and the exchange partner do exchange rights, the
transaction qualifies as an exchange.
C. Starker, Deferred Exchanges, and the Purpose of 1031
In Starker v. United States, the Ninth Circuit revolutionized
the world of like-kind exchanges and extended the exchange re-
quirement by holding that a deferred exchange (one in which the tax-
payer transfers relinquished property and receives replacement at a
later time) can qualify for like-kind exchange treatment.12 1  The
Starker decision also caused Congress to ultimately legislate in the
area of deferred exchanges. 122  Starker, the taxpayer, transferred
property to Crown Zellerbach Corporation (Crown) in exchange for
120 Halpern v. United States, 286 F. Supp. 255, 258 (N.D. Ga. 1968); cf. Rev.
Rul. 57-244, 1957-1 C.B. 247. The Service allowed like-kind exchange treatment
to a taxpayer who transferred property to one party and received property from
another party. Rev. Rul. 57-244. The taxpayer and the other parties involved in the
transaction had originally purchased all three lots that were involved in the transac-
tion together. Id. Because the facts of this Ruling are so limited, it should not be
assumed that a taxpayer will be granted like-kind exchange treatment in other types
of transactions in which the taxpayer transfers property to one party and receives
property from another party. Id.
121 602 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1979).
122 H.R. REP. No. 98-432, pt. 2 at 1231 (1984).
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Crown's promise to acquire suitable exchange property and transfer
such property to the taxpayer no later than five years from the time
the taxpayer transferred the property to Crown. 123 Crown promised
that it would pay the taxpayer a "growth factor" equal to six per cent
of the taxpayer's outstanding balance at the end of each year, and
that, if it did not transfer all of the property to the taxpayer within a
five-year period, it would pay the taxpayer cash equal to the amount
of the taxpayer's outstanding balance at the end of the five-year pe-
riod. 124 Crown completed the transfer of all of the properties it
agreed to transfer two years after the taxpayer originally transferred
property to it.125 The Court held that qualification as a like-kind ex-
change does not require simultaneous transfer of property.'2 6 If si-
multaneity is not a requirement for a transfer to qualify as a like-kind
exchange, simultaneity is afortiori not a requirement for a transfer to
qualify as an exchange. Therefore, an exchange can occur for the
purposes of section 1031 even though exchange partners do not trans-
fer properties simultaneously.
At the time the Ninth Circuit decided Starker, no law existed
stating whether deferred exchanges qualified for section 1031 treat-
ment. Consequently, the Court had to determine the meaning of sec-
tion 1031.127 The Court, however, was not so presumptuous that it
believed it had correctly divined the law in this area. Therefore, it
invited Congress to "clarify its meaning" if the Court had incorrectly
applied the law. 128 Congress accepted this invitation by enacting into
law section 1031(a)(3).
Section 1031(a)(3) provides two requirements that must be
met for property received in a deferred exchange to be treated as like-
kind property. 9 First, the property to be received must be identified
no later than forty-five days after the day on which the taxpayer
123 602 F.2d at 1342-43.
124 Id. at 1343.
125 Id.
126 Id. at 1355.
127 Id. at 1356.
128 Id.
129 I.R.C. § 1031 (2001).
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transferred the relinquished property. 13  Second, the taxpayer must
receive the property before the earliest of 180 days after the day on
which the taxpayer transferred the relinquished property or the day
on which the taxpayer's tax return is due.13 1 This provision clearly
curtails the leeway granted to taxpayers by the Starker decision.
However, like the Starker decision, this legislation also clearly pro-
vides that the lack of simultaneity does not disqualify a transaction
from being treated as an exchange for the purposes of section 1031.
Congress enacted section 1031(a)(3) due to its concern that
like-kind treatment of Anon-simultaneous exchanges has given rise
to unintended results and administrative problems. 132 To support this
conclusion Congress stated that the rationale for allowing tax-
deferred treatment for like-kind exchanges (i.e. the taxpayer has not
realized a profit):
is less applicable in the case of deferred exchanges.
To the extent that the taxpayer is able to defer comple-
tion of the transaction B often retaining the right to
designate the property to be received at some future
point B the transaction begins to resemble less a like-
kind exchange and more a sale of one property fol-
lowed, at some future point, by a purchase of a second
property or properties.
This statement by Congress shows Congress' belief that one
of the original purposes, namely tax-deferred treatment when a tax-
payer continues an investment, is abused if too much time passes be-
tween the time the taxpayer transfers property and the time the tax-
payer receives property. In light of this Congressional concern, the
enactment of section 1031 (a)(3) represents a statement by Congress
that a taxpayer can preserve its original investment if, and only if, a
short period of time lapses between the transfer of the original in-
vestment property and the subsequent receipt of the replacement
130 I.R.C. § 1031(a)(3)(A)(2001).
131 I.R.C. § 1031(a)(3)(B)(2001).
132 H.R. REP. No. 98-432, pt. 2 at 1232 (1984).
133 Id.
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property. The legislative history also implies that to facilitate admin-
istrative convenience, the transfer must be completed prior to the
taxpayer's tax return due date.' 
34
Since like-kind exchange treatment is granted if replacement
property is received no later than six months after relinquished prop-
erty is transferred, the statute provides, a fortiori, that an. exchange
occurs even if the transfers are not simultaneous. Therefore, section
1031(a)(3) does not limit the definition of exchange to simultaneous
transfers of property for purposes of section 1031.135 Since simulta-
neity is not a requirement of section 1031, reverse exchanges should
be allowed if they otherwise satisfy the purpose and requirements of
section 1031.
D. Like-Kind Exchange Regulations
Once the door was opened by Starker for deferred like-kind
exchanges, a new problem for taxpayers arose. In Starker, the tax-
payer was dealing with a credit-worthy exchange partner, a luxury
not all taxpayers enjoy. If a taxpayer is concerned that the exchange
partner will not perform its part of the bargain, the taxpayer may
want some sort of assurance that the exchange partner will purchase
replacement property and transfer it to the taxpayer. A potential
problem may arise if the taxpayer uses a security arrangement; the
taxpayer may be deemed to have constructively received cash in the
exchange, thereby losing like-kind exchange treatment.'
1 36
The Treasury has provided safer harbors that, if properly used
by a taxpayer, will provide assurance that the taxpayer will not be
deemed to have received cash in deferred like-kind exchanges. 137 If a
134 See id.
135 In enacting section 1031(a)(3), Congress only addressed forward exchanges.
There is no indication from the legislative history or the text of section 1031 (a)(3),
however, that Congress intended to limit the scope of nonsimultaneity to forward
deferred exchanges. Part III.G. infra offers means by which reverse exchanges can
be structured to satisfy Congress' purpose in enacting section 103 1(a)(3).
136 Halpern v. United States provides an example of a transaction in which the
taxpayer was held to have constructively received cash. 286 F.Supp. 255, 259
(N.D. Ga. 1968).
137 Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(k)-I(g) (as amended in 1994).
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taxpayer uses one of the four safe harbors identified in Treas. Reg.
1.103 1(k)-l(g)(2) through (g)(5) (as amended in 1994), the result will
be "a determination that the taxpayer is not in actual or constructive
receipt of money or other property for the purposes of section 1031..
• .,138 In promulgating the safe harbors, the Service specifically
stated that the regulations would not apply to reverse exchanges.139
The Service also stated that it would continue to consider the appli-
cability of the general rule of section 1031(a)(1) to reverse ex-
changes. Although the safe harbors do not apply to reverse ex-
changes, they show that the Treasury is willing to facilitate the use of
multiple-party-deferred exchanges so long as the property-for-
property and reciprocal requirements are met. If the Treasury is will-
ing to provide safe harbors for forward deferred exchanges that meet
the exchange requirement of section 1031, it should also provide
guidance that facilitate reverse exchanges. To understand what the
Treasury considers appropriate in structuring multiple-party-deferred
exchanges, it is worthwhile to consider each of the safe harbors in the
regulations. Doing so will unveil principles that can be applied to
reverse exchanges.
The first of the four safe harbors allows the taxpayer to retain
a security interest in the property, obtain a standby letter of credit
which may be drawn upon in the event the exchange partner defaults,
or obtain a guarantee from a third party. 141 If properly structured,
each of these devices will be disregarded in determining whether the
taxpayer has actually or constructively received money or other
property in the transaction. 142 Therefore, retaining a security interest
in the relinquished property will not cause the transaction to fail the
property-for-property requirement.
138 Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(k)- (g)(1) (as amended in 1994).
139 Like-Kind Exchanges B Limitations on Deferred Exchanges; and Inapplica-
bility of Section 1031 to Exchanges of Partnership Interests, 56 Fed. Reg. 19,933
(May 1, 1991) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1) (Preamble to the Regulations).
140 Id.
141 Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(k)-l(g)(2) (as amended in 1994).
142 Id.
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The second safe harbor provides that if the exchange partner
places cash or a cash equivalent in a qualified escrow or a qualified
trust to secure the exchange partner's obligation to transfer replace-
ment property to the taxpayer, the qualified trust or qualified escrow
will be disregarded in determining whether the taxpayer was in actual
or constructive receipt of the funds deposited therein. 143 If all the
requirements in the regulations are satisfied, the taxpayer will be
deemed to have met the property-for-property requirement even
though cash in a qualified escrow or qualified trust secures the ex-
change partner's obligation to acquire replacement property and
transfer it to the taxpayer.
The third safe harbor allows a taxpayer to use a qualified in-
termediary to facilitate the transfer of property which the Service will
not consider the taxpayer's agent. 144 In structuring the transaction
with the qualified intermediary, the taxpayer may arrange to have the
intermediary receive and transfer the title to both the relinquished
property and the replacement property. 145 The taxpayer may also
arrange to have the rights of either property transferred to the inter-
mediary and legal title pass directly between the taxpayer and the
purchaser or seller. 146  This regulation follows the Haden147 and
Biggs148 decisions, so it adds nothing new to the law, but it may pro-
vide some comfort for taxpayers.
The fourth safe harbor provides that in determining whether
the taxpayer is in actual or constructive receipt of cash, the Service
will disregard the fact that the taxpayer Ais or may be entitled to re-
ceive any interest or growth factor with respect to the deferred ex-
change. 14 9 Again, this is merely an example of the Treasury follow-
ing a prior court decision B Starker in this case.1 50 These safe har-
143 Treas. Reg.§ 1.1031(k)-l(g)(3) (as amended in 1994).
144 Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(k)-l(g)(4) (as amended in 1994).
145 Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(k)-l(g)(4)(iv)(A) (as amended in 1994).
146 Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(k)-1(g)(4)(v) (as amended in 1994).
147 Haden v. Commissioner, 165 F.2d 558 (5th Cir. 1948).
148 Biggs v. Commissioner, 632 F.2d 1171(5th Cir. 1980).
149 Treas. Reg.1.1031(k)-l(g)(5) (as amended in 1994). But see Treas. Reg. §
1.1031(k)-1(h)(2) (as amended in 1994) ("[t]he taxpayer must include the interest
orgrowth factor in income according to the taxpayer's method of accounting").
'
5 Starker v. United States, 602 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1979).
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bors provide taxpayers with guidelines they can follow when struc-
turing deferred exchanges. Although they do not result in new meth-
ods that can be used to structure like-kind exchanges, the safe harbors
do demonstrate that the Service does look for the two requirements of
section 1031 exchanges. Under the safe harbors, the taxpayer will be
deemed to have satisfied the property-for-property requirement.
Also, since the taxpayer is transferring property to one and only one
other party and receiving property from that same party, the recipro-
cal requirement will also be met. These regulations provide certain
methods for satisfying each of those requirements. By relying on
existing principles of like-kind exchanges, the Treasury could prom-
ulgate additional regulations or the Service could public a no-
challenge position that would provide guidance for taxpayers wishing
to enter into reverse exchanges.
E. Summary of the Section 1031 Purpose and Exchange
Requirement
As outlined above, three requirements must be met to qualify
for like-kind exchange treatment under section 1031(a)(1). 151 First,
an exchange must occur. 152 Legislative history and the Treasury
Regulations clearly state that an exchange occurs only when two re-
quirements are present: (1) a property-for-property transfer and (2) a
reciprocal transfer. 15 3 As seen above, the courts have been very strict
in construing the property-for-property requirement' 54. If the tax-
payer actually or constructively receives cash or a cash equivalent in
the process of a transaction, the transaction will not qualify as an ex-
change even if the taxpayer immediately transfers the cash to another
party for replacement property.' 55
As the cases discussed above illustrate, courts strictly require
a reciprocal transfer, but are lenient in allowing taxpayers to structure
transactions involving many different parties in such a way that the
151 See supra Part I.A.
152 I.R.C. § 1031(a)(1)(2001).
153 65 CONG. REC. 2799 (1924); Treas. Reg. § 1.1002-1(d) (1958).
154 See supra Part II.B.1.
155 See, e.g., Carlton v. United States, 385 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1967).
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end result is a reciprocal transfer.156 The courts and Treasury allow
many different steps to occur, and if the taxpayer ultimately transfers
property to one other person and the other person transfers property
to the taxpayer, the courts have held that an exchange has oc-
curred.157 In fact, the courts and Treasury do not require that the tax-
payer transfer title directly to the exchange partner or receive title to
the replacement property directly from the exchange partner so long
as the taxpayer and exchange partner exchange rights to the proper-
ties. 158 Although the Service has allowed like-kind exchange treat-
ment in one revenue ruling where the taxpayer transferred property to
one party and received property from another party, the facts of that
ruling are very limited and should not be used as a general rule.
159
The courts have, however, consistently ruled that the reciprocal re-
quirement has been met in cases where they have been able to iden-
tify the taxpayer transferring property (or rights in property) to and
receiving property (or rights in property) from just one other party. 160
Therefore, a taxpayer can expect to receive a ruling that the recipro-
cal requirement has been satisfied if the taxpayer structures a transac-
tion in such a manner that it transfers property to and receives prop-
erty from only one other party.
The Starker court, Congress, and the Service clearly have
provided that a transfer of property, followed by a subsequent receipt
of property qualifies as an exchange for purposes of section 103 1.161
Simultaneity is not a requirement that must be satisfied for an ex-
change to occur for purposes of section 1031.162 In enacting section
1031(a)(3), Congress provided that a deferred exchange is not in
harmony with the purpose of section 1031 (the taxpayer does not
continue its original investment and administrative inconvenience
156 See supra Part II.B.
157 See id.
158 See id.
159 See supra note 120.
160 See supra Part II.B.2.
161 See generally Part II.
162 See also Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Tomlinson, 399 F.2d 652, 658-59 (5th
Cir. 1968) (holding that the timing of the transfer and receipt of property should be
disregarded in situations in which the substance of a transaction is a like-kind ex-
change).
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results) if too much time lapses between the time the taxpayer trans-
fers property and the time the taxpayer receives property. 163 The
statute deems a taxpayer to have a continuation of an investment if
the taxpayer consummates an exchange within six months or prior to
the due date of the taxpayer's tax return. 164 Therefore, a reverse ex-
change should be allowed section 1031 treatment if the taxpayer
transfers property to and receives property from one, and only one,
exchange partner, and the transaction is completed within a reason-
able amount of time so as not to disrupt the purpose of section 1031.
IH. REVERSE EXCHANGES
As mentioned earlier, the body of law dealing directly with
reverse exchanges is scant.1 65 In fact, a good argument exists that
two private letter rulings issued by the Service to a single utility
company on the same transaction represent the only body of law
dealing directly with the reverse exchange issue. 166 Although some
cases appear to address reverse exchanges, those cases are actually
dealing with transactions that actually do not meet the exchange re-
quirement at all, and therefore are not reverse exchanges. 167 There-
fore, they do not provide much help for taxpayers. The American
Bar Association Tax Section (ABA) has made two proposals to the
Service in the last ten years, hoping the Service would provide some
direction regarding reverse exchanges. In the first proposal, the ABA
suggested that the Service should allow reverse exchanges. 168 In the
second, it suggested that the Service should approve an alternative
measure that circumvents the reverse exchange issue. 169
163 I.R.C. § 1031(a)(3)(2001).
164 Id.
165 See supra Part I.B.
166 Priv. Ltr. Rul. 98-23-045 (Mar. 10, 1998); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 98-14-019 (Dec.
23, 1997). Since section 61 10(k)(3) provides that letter rulings can not be relied on
as precedent, the letter rulings actually provide little assurance for taxpayers.
I.R.C. § 6110(k)(3)(2001).
167 See infra Part III.A
168 Section of Taxation American Bar Association, Report on the Application of
Section 1031 to Reverse Exchanges, 21 J. REAL EST. TAX'N 44 (Fall 1993).
169 Adam M. Handler, Price Waterhouse Coopers Forwards Proposed Guid-
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A. Cases Purporting to Address Reverse Exchanges
The first case often cited as a reverse exchange case is Ruth-
erford v. Commissioner. 170 In Rutherford, the taxpayer received
twelve half-blood heifers in 1973 from Wardlaw and as consideration
for the half-blood heifers, the taxpayer promised to transfer twelve
three-quarter blood heifers to Wardlaw over a period of time ending
in 1977."' To fulfill the obligation to transfer the twelve three-
quarter blood heifers, the taxpayer artificially inseminated the twelve
half-blood heifers and transferred twelve of the three-quarter heifers'
offspring to Wardlaw. 172 There are two reasons this case should not
be relied upon to support the validity of reverse exchanges. First, the
facts indicate that the exchange may not have been a reverse ex-
change. 173 The taxpayer did not actually receive the registration pa-
pers for the twelve half-blood heifers until all of the twelve three-
quarter blood heifers were transferred. 174 Wardlaw retained a secu-
rity interest in the twelve half-blood heifers that was effective until
all twelve three-quarter blood heifers were transferred. 175  If all
twelve half-blood heifers had died prior to the taxpayer fulfilling his
obligation, Rutherford would bear the risk of such lOSS. 176 These
facts create some uncertainty as to when the half-blood heifers were
actually transferred; it appears that legal title and the benefits and
burdens of ownership of the twelve half-blood heifers did not transfer
to the taxpayer until the taxpayer transferred the twelve three-quarter
ance on Reverse Exchanges, 2000 TAX NOTES TODAY 16-27 (January 20, 2000)
(The task force consisted of Adam M. Handler, Ron Platner, Bob Schachat, Lou
Weller, and Fred Witt. Adam M. Handler, Howard Levine, and Lou Weller all
contributed to the ABA proposal issued in 1993, supra note 174.); see also Paul J.
Sax, ABA Tax Section Members Push for Guidance on Reverse Like-Kind Ex-
changes, TAX NOTES TODAY (July 27, 2000)(LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file,
elec., cit. 2000 TNT 145-22). (repeating the proposal made in January 2000).
170 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 1851-77 (1978).
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blood heifers. 177 If the transfer of the twelve half-blood heifers did
not occur until after the taxpayer transferred the last three-quarter
blood heifer, the transaction was not a reverse exchange; it would
have been a simultaneous exchange or a deferred exchange. There-
fore, it probably is not a good case to rely upon to support the legal
validity of reverse exchanges.
The second reason the case represents weak support for re-
verse exchanges is that it is arguably not a like-kind exchange. As
mentioned earlier, the purpose of allowing tax-deferred treatment for
like-kind exchanges is that the taxpayer is continuing an invest-
ment. 178 The Tax Court has stated that in an exchange of like-kind
property, "the taxpayer's economic situation after the exchange is
fundamentally the same as it was before the transaction occurred." 1
79
In Rutherford, the taxpayer could not be said to have continued an
investment by receiving the twelve half-blood heifers because prior
to receiving the heifers, the taxpayer did not have an investment in
cattle. Since the purpose of section 1031 is to defer gain or loss
recognition until a taxpayer disposes of an investment, the transfer
could not satisfy the purpose because the taxpayer did not have an
investment to continue when it received the twelve half-blood heif-
ers. One court has held that the taxpayer must continue an invest-
ment to satisfy the requirements of section 1031.181 The taxpayer in
Rutherford arguably did not meet that requirement,' 82 so the ex-
change probably should not have been treated as a like-kind ex-
change. Furthermore, the facts in Rutherford are so unique, it is dif-
ficult to apply to most situations. Therefore Rutherford probably
should not be relied upon to argue that section 1031 applies to re-
verse exchanges.
Other cases looked at transactions involving taxpayers who
received property and subsequently transferred other property. 1
83
177 Id.
178 See supra Part II.A.
179 Koch v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 54, 63 (1978).
180 37 T.C.M. at 7851-79.
181 Chase v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 874 (1989).
182 37 T.C.M. at 7851-79.
183 Bezdjian v. Commissioner, 845 F.2d 217 (9th Cir. 1988); Lincoln v. Corn-
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These cases are important to look at because they demonstrate that a
transaction will not meet the reciprocal requirement if the taxpayer
does not receive property from the same party to whom the taxpayer
transfers property. Between 1986 and 1998 four cases were decided
in which the transactions involved were held to not qualify for sec-
tion 1031 treatment. 184 The first of these cases involved a taxpayer
who owned property in Hawaii.185 In 1977, the taxpayer purchased
some property in the state of Washington from the Craigs. 186 In
1978, the taxpayer sold the Hawaii property to five different purchas-
ers, none of whom were related to the Craigs. 187 The taxpayer had
the purchasers pay the purchase price directly to the Craigs and not to
the taxpayer.'88
The Tax Court held that the transfer did not qualify for like-
kind treatment.189 In making its decision, the Court stated that the
taxpayer "must demonstrate that the transfers of property in this case
were interdependent parts of an overall plan in order for such trans-
fers to constitute an 'exchange' within the meaning of section
1031."19° In determining that there was no interdependence, the Tax
Court stated that the two transfers made no reference to the other
transfers, the transfers occurred seven months apart, and the pay-
ments to Craig were made to satisfy the taxpayer's pre-existing obli-
gation to Craig. 191 Because of this lack of interdependence, the Court
found that no exchange had occurred, so the transaction could not
qualify for section 1031 treatment. 192 In effect, because the taxpayer
did not transfer property to and receive property from only one other
missioner, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 926 (1998); Dibsy v. Commissioner, 70 T.C.M.
(CCH) 918 (1995); Lee v. Commissioner, 51 T.C.M. (CCH) 1438 (1986).
184 Bezdjian v. Commissioner, 845 F.2d 217; Lincoln v. Commissioner, 76
T.C.M. (CCH) 926; Dibsy v. Commissioner, 70 T.C.M. (CCH) 918; Lee v. Com-
missioner, 51 T.C.M. (CCH) 1438.
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party, the reciprocal element of the exchange requirement of section
1031 had not been met. Therefore, the exchange could not qualify as
an exchange for section 1031 purposes.
Another case with similar facts was decided in the same man-
ner by the Ninth Circuit in 1988.193 In Bezdjian v. Commissioner, the
taxpayers operated a gas station on property which they leased from
Shell. 194 Shell offered to sell the gas station property to the taxpay-
ers, but refused to accept any consideration other than cash from the
taxpayers. 195 The taxpayers wanted to exchange other property it
owned (the El Camino property) for the gas station, but, because
Shell refused to enter into an exchange, the taxpayers took out a
mortgage on their home and the El Camino property and purchased
the gas station for cash. 196 Three weeks later, the taxpayers sold the
El Camino property to the Leveys who assumed the mortgage and
paid the remainder of the price in cash. 197 The taxpayers argued that
this transaction should qualify for section 1031 treatment. 198
The Ninth Circuit rejected the taxpayers' argument and held
that the taxpayers had not exchanged the El Camino property for the
gas station. 199 In so holding, the Court stated that the taxpayers
"must make an exchange of property or an interest in property for
other Property of a like kind in order for it to qualify for nonrecogni-
tion.''°° The Court also referred to the Biggs decision and distin-
guished the facts of the instant case from that case by stating that in
Biggs, the final analysis determined that there was an exchange be-
tween two parties.201 The Court stated that in the present case, the
taxpayers acquired one parcel of land in a purchase and sold another
parcel to a separate party. 2 2 Neither Shell nor the Leveys made an
exchange with the taxpayers; the two transactions involved cash con-




198 Id.199 Id. at 219.
200 Id. at 218.
201 Id. at 218-19.
202 Id. at 219.
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sideration. 203 Relying on these facts, the Court found that no ex-
change of property had occurred between the taxpayers and either of
the other two parties. 20 4 This decision provides additional support for
the notion that the lack of a reciprocal transfer causes a transaction to
fail to qualify for section 1031 treatment. A taxpayer who receives
property from one party and transfers property to another party does
not meet the reciprocal requirement, as demonstrated by this deci-
sion.
In 1995, the Tax Court again found that a transaction failing
to meet the reciprocal requirement would not qualify for section 1031
treatment. 20 5 In Dibsy v. Commissioner, the taxpayers purchased a
liquor store (Sunshine Liquor) from Hanshaw in 1986.2 The tax-
payers operated the store until 1989.207 In 1988, the taxpayers be-
came aware that Hanshaw might sell another of its stores, Bay-
shore.20 8 The taxpayers did not want to operate both Sunshine and
Bayshore, so they entered into an agreement on March 23, 1988 to
sell Sunshine to the Sathavorans. 20 9 On March 31, 1988, they entered
into an agreement with Hanshaw to purchase Bayshore. 2 0 The Sath-
avorans subsequently decided not to purchase Sunshine, but the tax-
payers purchased Bayshore on October 5, 1988 anyway. 2 1 1 The tax-
payers sold Sunshine on March 31, 1989 to a party that was not re-
212lated to Hanshaw. On their 1989 tax return, the taxpayers treated
the transfer of Sunshine as a like-kind exchange and did not report
any recognized gain on the transfer.213
The court found that the taxpayers did not exchange Sunshine
for Bayshore, but purchased Bayshore and sold Sunshine in two
203 Id. at 218
204 Id. at 219.
205 Dibsy v. Commissioner, 70 T.C.M. (CCH) 918, 922 (1995).







213 Id. at 918-919.
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separate transactions, 2 14 not qualifying for like-kind treatment. 215
This decision is appropriate since the taxpayers obviously failed to
meet the reciprocal requirement and consequently could not be found
to have entered into an exchange for the purposes of section 1031.
The last case in this series is Lincoln v. Commissioner,216 de-
cided in 1998. In that case, the taxpayer purchased a lot called Big
Sur from D'Esopo in 1992 and built a house on the lot which was to
217be rented. In 1993, the taxpayer sold another lot, Pacific Grove,
which it had owned prior to the purchase of Big Sur, to the Elvins.
218
The taxpayer had the Elvins deposit the purchase price in an account
at Provident Central Credit Union, and instructed Provident to use the
account balance to pay for the construction costs on Big Sur.
219
The Tax Court found that an exchange did not occur, citing
the Treas. Reg.§ 1.1002-1(d) requirement of a reciprocal transfer of
220properties. The Tax Court held that such a transfer did not oc-
cur.2 21 The Tax Court also stated that the taxpayers reliance on
Starker was misplaced because although Starker allows nonsimulta-
neous exchanges to occur, it "does not, however, dispense with the
requirement that there in fact be an exchange of property.', 222 Thus,
the issue in this case was not whether the transfers had to occur si-
multaneously but whether there was an actual exchange.2 23 Since the
Court found that there was no reciprocal transfer, it held that no ex-
change had occurred and the transaction did not qualify for section
1031 treatment.
2 24
Although in each of these four cases, the taxpayer received
property before transferring other property, none of the transactions
214 Id. at 922.
215 Id.
216 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 926 (1998).
217 Id. at 927.
218 Id.
219 Id.
220 Id. at 927-28.
221 Id. at 928.





can be classified as a reverse exchange. 225 To be classified as a re-
verse exchange, an exchange must first occur. Since the courts in
each case determined that the taxpayer received property from one
party and transferred property to different party, they were able to
determine no exchange occurred.226 This is the correct result since
the reciprocal requirement had not been met in any of the cases.
227
Since the reciprocal requirement had not been met, there was no ex-
change, and section 1031 treatment was unavailable. Because the
courts in each of these cases ultimately looked only at the exchange
requirement, they do not provide guidance for a taxpayer who meets
the exchange requirement, but transfers relinquished property after
receiving replacement property. Thus, the cases shed little light on
the issue of non-simultaneity in reverse exchanges.
B. Reverse Exchange Allowed
In two private letter rulings, the Service has ruled that a re-
228verse exchange qualifies for section 1031 treatment. The facts
upon which the Service based its ruling in both letter rulings are as
follows: the taxpayer owned an easement over land owned by a sepa-
rate party (the landowner). 2 29 The taxpayer had aerial power lines
located on the easement. 23  The landowner desired to construct a
building which would occupy part of the land over which the tax-
payer held the easement. 23 1 Before the building could be constructed
the taxpayer would have to relocate the power lines.232 To induce the
taxpayer to relocate its power lines, the landowner offered to transfer
225 Bezdjian v. Commissioner, 845 F.2d 217 (9th Cir. 1988); Lincoln v. Com-
missioner, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 926 (1998); Dibsy v. Commissioner, 70 T.C.M.
(CCH) 918 (1995); Lee v. Commissioner, 51 T.C.M. (CCH) 1438 (1986).
226 Id.
227 This is the same position the Service took in Tech. Adv. Mem. 00-39-005.
See supra note 11.
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to the taxpayer easements located elsewhere in exchange for the tax-
payer's easements. 233 The taxpayer and the landowner entered into
an agreement to effect this transfer.234 The agreement provided that
the landowner would transfer new easements to the taxpayer, the tax-
payer would construct power lines on the new easements, and, when
the power lines on the new easements were completely constructed
and operational, the taxpayer would transfer its old easements to the
landowner. 235 The Service ruled that this transaction met all the re-
quirements necessary to qualify for section 1031 treatment.
236
In ruling in favor of the taxpayer, the Service did not address
the exchange issue directly.237 To qualify for section 1031 treatment,
the exchange requirement must be met.238 Indeed, in examining the
facts of the ruling, one can determine that an exchange had occurred.
The taxpayer transferred an easement and received an easement.
239
This satisfies the property-for-property requirement. 240 The taxpayer
also entered into the transaction with only one exchange partner.
241
242Therefore, the reciprocal requirement was also satisfied. The tax-
payer also continued its original investment (power line easements)
after the exchange.243 The Service found that the other section 1031
requirements were also satisfied, so it followed that the transaction
should be given section 1031 treatment. Since these rulings were
merely private letter rulings, they do not provide authority for grant-
ing like-kind exchange treatment to all reverse exchanges, 244 but they






238 See supra Part II.B.
239 Priv. Ltr. Rul. 98-23-045.
240 See supra Part II.B. 1.
241 Priv. Ltr. Rul. 98-23-045.
242 See supra Part II.B.2.
243 Priv. Ltr. Rul. 98-23-045.
244 I.R.C.§ 61 10(k)(3)(2001); see also American Stores Co. v. Commissioner,
170 F.3d 1267, 1270 (10th Cir. 1999) ("[T]he Code prohibits the use or citation of
Private Letter Rulings and Technical Advice Memoranda as precedent. (omit cita-
tion) It is well settled that they do not bind the Commissioner or this court.").
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should qualify for section 1031 treatment.245 The Service's view in
these two private letter rulings demonstrate that the Service believes
that simultaneity is not a prerequisite for reverse exchanges to qualify
for section 1031 treatment. Since the Service is willing to provide
section 1031 treatment to one taxpayer who entered into a reverse
exchange, they should provide guidance for all taxpayers who desire
to enter into reverse exchanges.
C. Two Proposals
1. The 1993 Proposal
The Tax Section of the American Bar Association (the ABA)
has made two proposals to the Service suggesting that the Service
provide guidance for reverse exchanges.246 The first proposal made
in 1993 suggested that the Service should promulgate regulations that
would allow section 1031 treatment for certain reverse exchanges. 247
The ABA suggested that to qualify for section 1031 treatment, three
requirements must be satisfied: A(1) [t]he reverse exchange must
occur pursuant to a written exchange agreement; . . .(2) the taxpayer
must transfer the relinquished property to the same person from
whom he received the replacement property"; 248 and (3) the exchange
must be completed by the due date of the taxpayer's tax return.
The proposal also provided that the taxpayer could use a professional
intermediary that met the requirements in Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(K)-
1 (g)(4) to facilitate the exchange and that the taxpayer could advance
money to the seller of the replacement property without being con-
245 Comerica Bank, N.A. v. United States., 93 F.3d 225, 230 (6th Cir. 1996)
("While Private letter rulings [sic] are not binding authority, they may be cited as
evidence of administrative interpretation.").
246 Section of Taxation American Bar Association, supra note ABA 168; Han-
dler, supra note 169; see also Rutherford v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH)
1851-77 (1978).
247 Section of Taxation American Bar Association, supra note 168 at 48.
248 Id.
249 Id. at 48-49.
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sidered to have constructively received cash from the sale of the re-
placement property.
250
Other than providing too much time to transfer relinquished
property and allowing the taxpayer to advance money to the ex-
change partner, this proposal does satisfy the requirements necessary
for an exchange to receive section 1031 treatment. The requirement
that the taxpayer transfer property and receive property satisfies the
property-for-property requirement. 25 1 The requirement that the trans-
fer occurs only between the taxpayer and the exchange partner (the
qualified intermediary is deemed to be the exchange partner under
the regulations252) satisfies the reciprocal requirement.2 53 Therefore,
the two elements of the exchange requirement are satisfied.
An exchange that occurs under this proposal may not meet the
purposes or other requirements of section 103 1.254 By requiring that
the exchange be consummated prior to the taxpayer's tax return due
date, the proposal would satisfy the administrative convenience pur-
pose.255 However, Congress does not recognize a deferred exchange
as a continuation of an investment if too much time passes between
the transfer of relinquished property and the receipt of replacement
property because the transaction begins to look like a sale followed
by a repurchase. 25 6 If too much time passes before the relinquished
property is transferred, the transaction begins to look like a purchase
followed by a sale of other property. For example, a taxpayer could
enter into an agreement to receive property and, in exchange, promise
to transfer property at some time in the future. After several months,
when the taxpayer transfers the property, the transfer may look more
like the taxpayer was satisfying a contractual obligation than it would
look like the taxpayer was exchanging property. 25 If that were the
250 Id. at 50.
251 See supra Part II.B. 1.
252 Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(k)-l(g)(4) (as amended in 1994).
253 See supra Part II.B.2.
254 See supra Part II.A.
255 See id.
256 See supra Part II.C.
257 See supra text accompanying note 185 et seq. for a discussion of the ruling
by the court in Lee v. Commissioner in which the court stated that a transaction did
not qualify for like-kind exchange treatment where one party to the transaction paid
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case, the transaction would look like two different transfers: (1) the
receipt of property in exchange for a promise, and (2) the transfer of
property in satisfaction of an obligation. Merely entering into a writ-
ten agreement will not eliminate this possibility. The same problem
Congress addressed when enacting section 1031(a)(3) exists with
reverse exchanges. By allowing reverse exchanges to be consum-
mated no sooner than the taxpayer's tax return due date, more time
may pass than Congress intends. 258 Thus, any ruling allowing re-
verse exchanges should require that the exchange be completed by
the earlier of six months from the date the relinquished property is
transferred or the taxpayer's tax return due date, causing the transac-
tion to look more like a continuation of the taxpayer's original in-
vestment.
Reverse exchanges also raise additional issues. If a taxpayer
receives replacement property used in a trade or business and oper-
ates that property and the relinquished property together for too long
a period of time, the replacement property looks less like a continua-
tion of the original investment and more like a different investment.
For example, in Dibsy v. Commissioner, the taxpayer operated a liq-
uor store. When the taxpayer found that it could acquire a differ-
ent store that it considered more desirable, the taxpayer purchased the
other store and began to operate it as a business.2  The taxpayer op-
erated both the Bayshore store and the Sunshine store, receiving prof-
a preexisting obligation of the taxpayer. 51 T.C.M. (CCH) 1438, 1443 (1996). The
court found in that situation that the taxpayer had entered into two transactions: one
involved the receipt of property in exchange for a promise to pay cash, the other
involved in the transfer of property in exchange for a promise to pay the taxpayer's
obligation. Id. The court found that this type of arrangement did not satisfy the
exchange requirement. Id. The problem could arise in a two-party exchange if a
court finds that the taxpayer actually exchanged a promise for the replacement
property and later satisfied that promise by transferring relinquished property. The
more time that passes between the receipt of replacement property and the transfer
of relinquished property, the less the transaction looks like an exchange.
258 Sax, supra note 169 (stating that more than twenty-one months may elapse
between the time the replacement property is received and the relinquished prop-
erty is transferred).
259 70 T.C.M. (CCH) 918, 919 (1995).
260 Id.
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its and losses on each store.26 1 Thus, the taxpayer was able to benefit
from both stores for a period of time. This made it possible for the
taxpayer to get a much larger return than would have been possible if
only the original investment were operated. By requiring the tax-
payer to enter into a written agreement to transfer the relinquished
property within six months, the ABA's proposal helps to ensure that
the taxpayer does intend to continue an original investment. 262 By
promising to transfer relinquished property, the taxpayer manifests its
intent to replace the relinquished property. Furthermore, if the writ-
ten agreement identifies the relinquished property to be transferred,
the taxpayer's intent would be manifest more clearly.
Allowing the taxpayer to forward money to the seller of the
replacement property also gives cause for concern. Courts could
look at the forwarding of the funds and the subsequent receipt of
funds as a purchase followed by a resale. If the taxpayer transfers
cash to the seller and the seller agrees to transfer the cash back when
it receives the proceeds in exchange for the relinquished property, the
transaction looks like a purchase of the replacement property fol-
lowed by a sale of the relinquished property. Because cash is fungi-
ble, there is no way to know that the seller actually returned the cash
the taxpayer forwarded to the seller, as opposed to simply transfer-
ring the proceeds it received from the sale of the other property.
2. The 2000 Proposal
The ABA's second proposal (originally published in January
of 2000) presents a means of avoiding reverse exchanges and possi-
ble negative treatment more than a means of structuring reverse ex-
changes that qualify for section 1031 treatment.263 Under this pro-
posal, the ABA asked the Service to issue a revenue procedure to
provide some guidance. 264  The ABA suggested that the Service
should state that it will not challenge the validity of an exchange that
261 Id.
262 Section of Taxation American Bar Association, supra note 168; see also
Bezdjian v. Commissioner, 845 F. 2d 217 (9th Cir. 1988).
263 Handler, supra note 169; see also Sax, supra note 169.
264 Id.
Virginia Tax Review
uses "qualified exchange accommodation arrangements.,, 26' A quali-
fied exchange accommodation arrangement can be structured using
one of two methods. 26 6 Under the first method, the exchange-last
267
method, a party that is unrelated to the taxpayer (the accommoda-
tion title holder) acquires title to replacement property and holds it
until the taxpayer is prepared to transfer the relinquished property. 268When the taxpayer is prepared to transfer the relinquished property,
the accommodation title holder transfers title of the relinquished
property in one of two ways: either the taxpayer transfers the relin-
quished property to the qualified intermediary and receives the re-
placement property from the qualified intermediary, or the taxpayer
transfers the replacement property directly to the taxpayer and the
taxpayer transfers the relinquished property directly to the accommo-
dation titleholder.269 The ABA suggested that the revenue procedure
provide that the Service will not challenge the treatment of the ac-
commodation titleholder as the beneficial owner of the property to
which it holds title. 27 The proposal simply provides a means of
structuring a simultaneous exchange.
271
272The second method, the exchange-first method, involves
the accommodation titleholder purchasing replacement property and
transferring it to the taxpayer in exchange for the relinquished prop-
273erty. The accommodation titleholder then holds the relinquished
property until a buyer can be found.274 If the accommodation title-
holder is treated as the beneficial owner when it holds legal title to
the relinquished property, the transaction should qualify as an ex-
275change because a reciprocal transfer of title has occurred. The




268 Handler, supra note 169; see also Sax, supra note 169.
269 Id.
270 Id.
271 Massey, supra note 15.
272 Weller & Phillips, supra note 267 at § 14.02(3)(b).
273 Rutherford v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 1851-77 (1978).
274 Id.
275 See supra Part II.B.2.
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meet all of the exchange requirements under section 1031. Because
the exchanges under both of these methods would be deemed to be
simultaneous exchanges, the proposal does not provide guidance for
taxpayers who wish to structure pure reverse exchanges.
D. Revenue Procedure 2000-37
By issuing Revenue Procedure 2000-37,276 the Service has
adopted the general format set forth in the ABA's second proposal
relating to parking arrangements. Revenue Procedure 2000-37 can
be divided into three main parts: (1) the general rule, (2) the six re-
quirements, and (3) the permissible agreements.277
1. The General Rule
The general rule provides that:
The Service will not challenge the qualification of
property as either "replacement property" or "relin-
quished property" (as defined in § 1.1031(k)-l(a)) for
purposes of § 1031 and the regulations thereunder, or
the treatment of the exchange accommodation title-
holder as the beneficial owner of such property for
federal income tax purposes, if the property is held in
a [qualified exchange accommodation arrangement (a
AQEAA)] .27
The significance of this rule is that the Service will accept the
exchange accommodation titleholder as the beneficial owner of the
property it holds title to even though the taxpayer might otherwise
bear the economic burdens and benefits of ownership of the prop-
erty.279 This is contrary to the well-established federal tax principles
under which the party bearing the economic burdens and benefits of
276 2000-40 I.R.B. 308.
277 Id.
278 Id at § 4.01.
279 Id at § 2.06.
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ownership is considered the owner of the property. 28 This represents
the true advantage of Revenue Procedure 2000-37.
2. The Six Requirements
To benefit from Revenue Procedure 2000-37 property must
281be held in a QEAA . Under the revenue procedure, property is
deemed to be held in a QEAA if six requirements are met.282 First, a
person other than the taxpayer or a disqualified person must serve as
the exchange accommodation titleholder,283 and the accommodation
titleholder must be "subject to federal income tax or, if such person is
treated as a partnership or S corporation for federal income tax pur-
poses, more than 90 percent of its interests or stock [must be] owned
by partners or shareholders who are subject to federal income tax." 284
Also, the exchange accommodation titleholder must hold a qualified
indicia of ownership.285
For this purpose, a qualified indicia of ownership is defined
as:
[L]egal title to the property, other indicia of ownership
of the property that are treated as beneficial ownership
of the property under applicable principles of com-
mercial law (e.g., a contract for deed), or interests in
an entity that is disregarded ... for federal income tax
purposes (e.g., a single member limited liability com-
pany) and that holds either legal title to the property or
such other indicia of ownership[.] 286
The exchange accommodation titleholder does not have to
take actual legal title to the property to meet this requirement. In
fact, by receiving only an interest in a single member limited liability
280 Id at § 2.03; see also Rev. Rul. 82-144, 1982-2 C.B. 34, 35.
281 Rev. Proc. 2000-37.
282 Id. at § 4.02.
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company, the exchange accommodation titleholder may be able to
shield itself from liability that could otherwise arise from taking title
to the property. This could become significant in structuring parking
arrangements.
Second, at the time the exchange accommodation titleholder
receives the qualified indicia of ownership, the taxpayer must have
the "bona fide intent that the property held by the exchange accom-
modation titleholder represent either replacement property or relin-
quished property in an exchange that is intended to qualify for non-
recognition of gain (in whole or in part) or loss under section
1031 .....,287 This requirement helps to establish the interdependence
that courts have found lacking in many attempts taxpayers have made
to qualify reverse exchanges for like-kind exchange treatment.
288
Third, the taxpayer and the exchange accommodation title-
holder must enter into a written agreement no later than five days
after the accommodation titleholder receives a qualified indicia of
ownership. 289 The agreement must provide that (1) the exchange
accommodation titleholder is holding the property for the benefit of
the taxpayer in order to facilitate an exchange under section 1031 and
Revenue Procedure 2000-37, (2) the taxpayer and the exchange ac-
commodation titleholder agree to report the acquisition, holding, and
disposition of the property as provided in Revenue Procedure 2000-
37, and (3) the exchange accommodation titleholder will be treated as
the beneficial owner of the property for all federal income tax pur-
poses. 290 Furthermore, the taxpayer and the exchange accommoda-
tion titleholder must report the federal income tax attributes of the
property on their federal income tax returns in a manner consistent
with this agreement.
291
Fourth, the taxpayer must identify the relinquished property
within forty-five days after the exchange accommodation titleholder
receives a qualified indicia of ownership of the replacement prop-
287 Id. at § 4.02(2).
288 See supra note 183 et seq. and accompanying text.
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292erty. Identification must be made in accordance with Treas. Reg. §
1.1031(k)-i (c) (as amended in 1994) and the taxpayer may identify
alternative and multiple properties, as described in Treas. Reg. §
1.1031(k)-1(c)(4). 293 The three-property rule and the 200-percent
rule found in Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(k)-1(c)(4) will apply to the identi-
fication of the replacement property.
Fifth, in an exchange-last arrangement, within 180 days after
the exchange accommodation titleholder receives a qualified indicia
of ownership, the replacement property must be transferred either
directly or indirectly through a qualified intermediary to the tax-
payer. If the transaction is an exchange-first arrangement, within
180 days after the exchange accommodation titleholder receives a
qualified indicia of ownership, the relinquished property must be
transferred to a person who is not the taxpayer or a disqualified per-
son.
295
Sixth, the replacement property and relinquished property
cannot be held in a QEAA for more than a combined total of 180
days.296 If all six of these requirements are met, the exchange ac-
commodation titleholder will be deemed to be the beneficial owner of
the property in which it holds a qualified indicia of ownership.297
Revenue Procedure 2000-37 also very leniently allows the
taxpayer and the exchange accommodation titleholder to enter into
various agreements while the property is held by the exchange ac-
commodation titleholder. 298 Also, the revenue procedure does not
require that such agreements contain terms that typically would result
from arm's-length bargaining between unrelated parties.299 These
aspects of the revenue procedure must be examined.
292 Id. at § 4.02(4).
293 Id.
294 Id. at § 4.02(5)(a).
295 Id. at § 4.02(5)(b).
296 Id. at § 4.02(6).
297 Id. at § 4.01.
298 Id. at § 4.03.
299 Id.
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3. The Permissible Agreements
There are seven agreements that the revenue procedure spe-
cifically allows. 300 First, the revenue procedure provides that the ex-
change accommodation titleholder may enter into an exchange
agreement with the taxpayer to serve as a qualified intermediary if
the exchange accommodation titleholder otherwise qualifies as a
qualified intermediary. 30 1 Second, the revenue procedure allows the
taxpayer or a disqualified person to guarantee some or all of the obli-
gations of the exchange accommodation titleholder. 30 2 The taxpayer
or a related party may guarantee either secured or unsecured obliga-
tions of the exchange accommodation titleholder. 30 3 Furthermore,
the taxpayer or a related party may indemnify the exchange accom-
modation titleholder against costs and expenses incurred in relation
to the transaction. 3 4 This type of agreement allows the taxpayer to
accept some of the costs of owning the property and to guarantee ob-
ligations of the exchange accommodation titleholder.
Third, under the revenue procedure, a taxpayer or a disquali-
fied person is allowed to loan or, advance funds to the exchange ac-
commodation titleholder at other-than-market rates of interest. 305 A
taxpayer or disqualified person may also guarantee a loan or advance
to the exchange accommodation titleholder, allowing the taxpayer to
make an interest-free loan to the exchange accommodation title-
holder. 306 Fourth, the exchange accommodation titleholder may lease
the property in which it holds a qualified indicia of ownership to the
taxpayer or a disqualified person. 307 Since the revenue procedure
does not require the exchange accommodation titleholder to charge
arm's-length amounts for rent,308 the lease can be for an amount well
below or above market value. Thus, the taxpayer may take posses-
300 Id.
301 Id. at § 4.03(1).
302 Id. at § 4.03(2).
303 Id.
304 Id.
305 Id. at § 4.03(3).
306 Id.
307 Id. at § 4.03(4).
308 Id. at § 4.03.
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sion of the property rent-free while it is held by the exchange ac-
commodation titleholder.
Fifth, the revenue procedure provides that the taxpayer or a
disqualified person may manage the property, supervise improvement
of the property, act as contractor, or otherwise provide services to the
exchange accommodation titleholder with respect to the property and
be paid an amount which is other than an arm's-length rate for such
services.309 Sixth, the taxpayer and the exchange accommodation
titleholder may enter into option-type agreements or arrangements
relating to the purchase or sale of the property.310 Finally, the tax-
payer and exchange accommodation titleholder may agree or arrange
for the taxpayer to advance additional funds or receive funds from
the exchange accommodation titleholder if the value of the relin-
quished property fluctuates while being held by the exchange ac-
commodation titleholder.3
11
These provisions of the revenue procedure provide the tax-
payer with a significant amount of comfort and leeway in structuring
exchanges. By adding the last two permissible elements to an
agreement, the economic burdens and benefits of ownership can be
shifted from the exchange accommodation titleholder to the taxpayer.
In addition, the taxpayer can become presently obligated to purchase
the property and the exchange accommodation titleholder can be-
come presently obligated to sell the property. Although Revenue
Procedure 2000-37 provides great latitude to taxpayers, it leaves sev-
eral questions unanswered.3 12
E. Special Issues Relating to Revenue Procedure 2000-37
1. The Transfer Issue
Revenue Procedure 2000-37 creates new issues for like-kind
exchange transactions not previously seen in this area. As stated
309 Id. at § 4.03(5).
310 Id. at § 4.03(6).
311 Id. at § 4.03(7).
312 See Bradley T. Borden, New Safe Harbor Promotes Reverse Exchanges, 66
PRAcTIcAL TAx STRATEGIEs 68, 74-75 (February 2001).
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above, under Revenue Procedure. 2000-37, the taxpayer may lease
the property to which the exchange accommodation titleholder is
deemed to hold a beneficial interest at rates well below an arm's-
length rate.313 The taxpayer may also manage such property and su-
pervise construction thereon. 31 Furthermore, the taxpayer and ex-
change accommodation titleholder may enter into an agreement to
compensate each other for any fluctuations in the value of the relin-
quished property during the period that the exchange accommodation
titleholder holds the property. 315 These types of agreements are those
historically considered when determining whether a transfer of prop-
erty has occurred.316 By stating that it will turn a blind eye on these
factors, the Service has created a new legal concept that heretofore
has not been present in the area of like-kind exchanges. In doing
this, the Service has created a new standard for determining whether
property has been transferred. It would appear that the Service did
not rely on any law enacted by Congress or precedent established by
the courts to do this; it merely created a new standard based on sug-
gestions by practitioners and administrative convenience. Although
convenient for taxpayers and tax practitioners, the revenue procedure
appears to lack legal foundation.
2. Potential Income Tax Consequences
A taxpayer entering an exchange allowed by the revenue pro-
cedure must be aware of some potential income tax consequences
that may result therefrom. For example, the revenue procedure pro-
vides that the taxpayer or a disqualified person may use the property
to which the exchange accommodation titleholder holds beneficial
title virtually rent-free by allowing the taxpayer to lease the property
at a rate less than an arm's length amount.317 In addition, the tax-
payer may perform services with regard to the property and charge
313 Rev. Proc. 2000-7 at § 4.03(4).
314 Id. at § 4.03(5).
315 Id. at § 4.03(6).
316 See, e.g., Grodt & McKay Realty, Inc. v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1221,
1237 (1981); see also Coleman, 53 T.C.M. (CCH) 598, 603 (1987) (listing the
factors courts consider in determining whether an exchange has occurred).
317 Rev. Proc. 2000-37 at § 4.03(4).
708 Virginia Tax Review [Vol. 20:659
the exchange accommodation titleholder less than an arm's-length
rate to perform such services. 318 The rent-free use of the property by
the taxpayer should result in income to the taxpayer, and the receipt
of free services by the exchange accommodation titleholder should
result in income to the exchange accommodation title holder.319 The
interest-free use of an advance or loan between the taxpayer and the
exchange accommodation titleholder may also cause income to be
recognized to one or both parties.32 This may not be a disincentive
to using a QEAA, but it should be considered by any taxpayer con-
sidering such an arrangement.
3. Depreciation
The revenue procedure clearly states that the issues relating to
depreciation and the entering into of option-type transactions are not
addressed in the procedure. 32 1 Therefore, taxpayers are left to specu-
late as to how these items should be reported. As far as depreciation
is concerned, the agreement between the taxpayer and the exchange
accommodation titleholder must provide that the exchange accom-
modation titleholder will be treated as the owner of property in which
it holds a qualified indicia of ownership. 322 Therefore, the taxpayer
will not be allowed to take a depreciation deduction for property held
by the exchange accommodation titleholder.
323
The exchange accommodation titleholder will most likely
also be denied the deduction for depreciation. Under Sections
167(a)(1) and (2), a deduction for depreciation is allowed only if the
taxpayer uses the property in a trade or business or holds it for in-
vestment.324 Because the exchange accommodation titleholder pur-
chases property as part of a QEAA, and knows when it is acquired
318 Id. at § 4.03(5).
319 Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. 426, 431-33 (1955) (holding
that undeniable accessions to wealth, clearly realized, and over which they taxpay-
ers have complete dominion are taxable income to the taxpayers).
320 I.R.C. § 1272(a), 7872(a)(b).
321 Rev. Proc. 2000-37 at § 3.03.
322 Id. at § 4.02(3).
323 Borden, supra note 312.
324 I.R.C. § 167(a)(1), (a)(2)(2001).
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that it will be sold, the exchange accommodation titleholder arguably
does not hold the property for either use in a trade or business or for
investment.325 Consequently, the exchange accommodation title-
holder will not be allowed to take a deduction for depreciation on the
property it holds, causing no depreciation to be allowed for property
while it is held by the exchange accommodation titleholder. 326
Revenue Procedure 2000-37 provides a safe harbor for tax-
payers who wish to effect the equivalent of a reverse exchange. 327
The revenue procedure is very lenient in allowing taxpayers to enter
into agreements with exchange accommodation titleholders. Al-
though helpful, some issues are not addressed by Revenue Procedure
2000-37, leaving the question of the proper tax treatment of pure re-
verse exchanges unanswered.
F. Parking Arrangements Outside the Rev. Proc. 2000-37
Safe Harbor
Revenue Procedure 2000-37 specifically provides that this
new safe harbor does not prohibit taxpayers from structuring parking
arrangements outside the safe harbor.3 8 In a private letter ruling
published on March 19, 2001, the service took the position that a
transaction involving a parking arrangement outside the Rev. Proc.
2000-37 safe harbor can qualify for section 1031 treatment. 329 In that
ruling, the service provided that such parking arrangements must
meet three requirements for an exchange outside the safe harbor to be
recognized as a section 1031 exchange: A(1) the taxpayer must dem-
onstrate its intent to achieve an exchange and the properties to be
exchanged must be of like kind and for a qualified use; (2) the steps
in the various transfers must be part of an integrated plan to exchange
the relinquished property for the replacement property; and (3) the
325 Borden, supra note 312.
326 Id.
327 Rev. Proc. 2000-37 at § 4.01.
328 Id. at § 3.02.
329 Priv. Ltr. Rul. 01-11-025 (March 16, 2001).
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party holding the replacement property must not be the taxpayer's
agent.33
0
While the Service has sanctioned a parking arrangement oc-
curring outside the Rev.Proc. 2000-37 safe harbor, its ruling omits a
very critical analysis. As mentioned above, the significance of Rev.
Proc. 2000-37 is that it treats the titleholder as the beneficial owner
of the property it holds title to even though the taxpayer might other-
wise bear the economic burdens and benefits of ownership of the
property. 331 Without the protection of Rev. Proc. 2000-37, there is no
guarantee that the titleholder will be treated as the beneficial owner
of property of which it holds title. Instead, a benefits and burdens
analysis must be applied to transactions falling outside the safe har-
bor to determine whether the taxpayer is deemed to be the beneficial
owner of property even though another party may hold title to the
property. Because the ruling neglects to consider this point its utility
is extremely limited. Thus, exchanges falling outside the Rev. Proc.
2000-37 safe harbor must be carefully structured to avoid the inad-
vertent transfer of property.
332
G. Reverse Exchanges that Should Qualify for Section 1031
Treatment
The Service should not leave the issue the way it now stands.
More guidance is needed. For taxpayers who do not wish to use an
exchange accommodation titleholder, the Service should provide
guidance which directly addresses pure reverse exchanges. Because
principles based in the existing law provide a framework in which
reverse exchanges could be structured to qualify for like-kind ex-
change treatment, such guidance could easily be provided.
Based on the legal principles discussed above, three types of
reverse exchanges should be allowed section 1031 treatment: (1)
330 Id.
331 See supra Part III.D. 1
332 See, e.g., DeCleene v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 34 (2000) (holding that the
transfer to the titleholder in a parking transaction was a sham, so the transaction
failed to qualify for section 1031 treatment) and Tech. Adv. Mem. 00-39-005, su-
pra note 11.
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two-party reverse exchanges, (2) three-corner reverse exchanges, and
(3) four-corner reverse exchanges. To ensure that each of these ex-
changes conforms to the original purposes of allowing like-kind ex-
changes tax-deferred treatment, the taxpayer should, as the ABA
proposed in 1993, be required to enter into a written agreement with
the exchange partner. The agreement should provide that the tax-
payer will transfer the relinquished property by the earlier of six
months from the date the taxpayer receives the replacement property
or the taxpayer's first tax return due date following the receipt of the
replacement property. The agreement should also identify what
property the taxpayer will transfer in the exchange. While this ele-
ment is not one suggested by the ABA in its 1993 proposal, identify-
ing the relinquished property at the time the agreement is entered into
shows that the taxpayer intends to continue an investment with the
replacement property. 333 By meeting these requirements, the transac-
tion will not cause administrative inconvenience, and the taxpayer
will show that the transaction is a continuation of the. investment held
in the relinquished property.
Private Letter Ruling 9823045 addresses a two-party reverse
exchange. 334 As the facts of that ruling demonstrate, a two-party re-
verse exchange is a property-for-property transfer between the tax-
payer and one exchange partner in which the taxpayer receives the
replacement property and subsequently transfers the relinquished
property.335 This type of transfer would satisfy the property-for-
property requirement because the taxpayer would transfer property
and receive property. It would also satisfy the reciprocal requirement
because only one other person would be involved in the exchange.
In the event that the exchange partner wants some sort of as-
surance that the taxpayer will actually transfer replacement property,
the exchange partner should be allowed to retain a security interest in
the replacement property, to require the taxpayer to place money into
a qualified escrow or qualified trust, 336 to receive a letter of credit, or
333 Section of Taxation American Bar Association, supra note 168.
334 Priv. Ltr. Rul. 98-23-045 (Mar. 10, 1998).
335 Id.
336 The requirements for qualified escrow and qualified trust found in Treas.
Reg. § 1.1031(k)-l(g)(3)(ii) and (iii) (as amended in 1994) should be used for re-
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to receive a third party guarantee. The Service should provide assur-
ance that it will disregard such devices when determining whether in
substance the taxpayer has purchased replacement property and sold
relinquished property. This rule would mirror the rules in the regula-
tions which allow such devices to be used in forward exchanges.
Since such devices are necessary to carry out reverse exchanges in
many cases, and since the Service has allowed their use in forward
exchanges, they should be allowed in reverse exchanges.
The two-party reverse exchange described above will satisfy
all of the requirements of an exchange for purposes of section 1031.
First, an exchange will have occurred. The taxpayer will have trans-
ferred property and received property, satisfying the property-for-
property requirement. By transferring property to one party and re-
ceiving property from only one party, the taxpayer will also satisfy
the reciprocal requirement. Furthermore, if the taxpayer and the ex-
change partner agree in writing that the taxpayer will transfer prop-
erty that is identified in the agreement before the taxpayer files its tax
return, the taxpayer will be able to show that it is continuing its origi-
nal investment. If completed by the time the taxpayer's tax return is
due, the transfer will not create administrative inconvenience. Once
a two-party reverse exchange is found to satisfy the purpose and re-
quirements of section 1031 and the time limits are established in
which the transaction must be completed, section 1031 should also be
extended to three-corner and four-corner reverse exchanges if they
meet the property-for-property and reciprocal requirements.
A three-corner reverse exchange is used when an exchange
partner has no use for the taxpayer's relinquished property, but is
willing to facilitate the transfer of such property. For example, sup-
pose Taxpayer owns Whiteacre and desires to replace it with Black-
acre which is owned by Exchange Partner. Exchange Partner is will-
ing to sell Blackacre to Taxpayer now, but does not want to acquire
Whiteacre for its own use. Third Party, however, does want to ac-
quire Whiteacre for its own use, but it will take Third Party three
months to obtain the necessary financing. Exchange Partner agrees
verse exchanges, substituting the word "taxpayer" with "exchange partner" where
appropriate.
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to facilitate the exchange. Therefore, on June 3, Taxpayer (who is a
calendar year taxpayer) and Exchange Partner enter into an agree-
ment whereby Exchange Partner agrees to transfer Blackacre to Tax-
payer now and Taxpayer agrees to transfer Whiteacre to Exchange
Partner in three months. On June 3, Third Party also agrees to pur-
chase Whiteacre from Exchange Partner in three months. Because
Exchange Partner does not want to be left without cash in three
months, it requires Taxpayer to agree to pay cash in three months if
Third Party is unable to obtain financing. At the end of three months,
Third Party does have the financing, and Whiteacre is transferred to
Exchange Partner who then sells it to Third Party.
This type of transaction should be granted section 1031
treatment. As shown above, a two-party reverse exchange can be
structured to satisfy the purpose and requirements of section 1031.
The only additional issue involved in a three-corner reverse exchange
(assuming it is completed within the required time frame) is whether
the exchange requirement is met. The three-corner transaction de-
scribed above does meet the exchange requirement. Taxpayer re-
ceived only property and transferred only property. Therefore, the
property-for-property requirement is met. Since Taxpayer transferred
property only to Exchange Partner and received property only from
Exchange Partner, the reciprocal requirement is also met. Therefore,
the transaction qualifies as an exchange for purposes of section 1031.
Since the written agreement requirement and the time requirement
are also satisfied, the exchange should meet the purposes of section
1031.
The agreement that Taxpayer pay cash if Third Party is un-
able to purchase Whiteacre is no different from the default agree-
ments in Coastal Terminals3 37 and W.D. Haden.338 Therefore, 'such a
provision should not affect the exchange requirement in reverse ex-
changes if no cash is actually paid. Furthermore, the Service should
disregard the use of a security interest, a deposit by Taxpayer or
Third Party of cash into a qualified escrow or trust, or a third-party
guarantor in determining whether Taxpayer has actually or construc-
337 Coastal Terminals, Inc. v. United States, 320 F.2d 333, 335 (4th Cir. 1963).
338 W.D. Hayden v. Commissioner, 165 F.2d 588, 590 (5th Cir. 1948).
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tively received cash or substantively has entered into a purchase fol-
lowed by the subsequent resale of property.
A four-comer exchange is necessary if the party who owns
the replacement property does not desire to facilitate the transfer of
the relinquished property to a third party. In such a situation, the
taxpayer should be allowed to used a qualified intermediary to facili-
tate the exchange. In a four-comer reverse exchange, the qualified
intermediary becomes the taxpayer's exchange partner. The seller of
the replacement property transfers the replacement property to the
qualified intermediary, the qualified intermediary transfers the re-
placement property to the taxpayer immediately, and within the re-
quired time period, the taxpayer transfers the relinquished property to
the qualified intermediary who then transfers it to a purchaser. The
qualified intermediary uses the funds received from selling the relin-
quished property to satisfy the purchase obligation it incurred in pur-
chasing the replacement property. In such a transaction, the Service
should agree to disregard the use of the qualified intermediary in de-
termining whether an agency relationship exists between the taxpayer
and the qualified intermediary.
Furthermore, the taxpayer should be able to receive the rights
in the replacement property from the qualified intermediary and re-
ceive the legal title directly from the seller much like the court in
Biggs339 allowed. The taxpayer should also be allowed to transfer the
rights in the relinquished property to the intermediary and transfer
legal title directly to the purchaser, much like the taxpayer did in
Biggs.340 In either situation, the taxpayer should still be deemed to
have satisfied the exchange requirement for purposes of section 1031
since there was a property-for-property exchange (i.e., rights in prop-
erty were exchanged for rights in other property, and no cash) and
since the exchange satisfied the reciprocal requirement (i.e., the tax-
payer exchanged property with only the qualified intermediary). The
timing principles that apply to two-party reverse exchanges apply to
four-corner reverse exchanges also; therefore, four-corner reverse
339 Biggs v. Commissioner, 632 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1980).
310 Id.
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exchanges should be granted section 1031 treatment if structured as
stated above and if completed within the required time period.
Finally, since Starker34 1 and the regulations allow a growth
factor or interest to accrue on a forward deferred exchange without
affecting the treatment of the transaction, 342 growth factors and inter-
est should be allowed in reverse exchanges. The taxpayer entering
into a reverse exchange, should be allowed a deduction for the
growth factor or interest if it is of a character that would otherwise be
deductible. Thus, in any of the methods used to effect a reverse ex-
change, even if the taxpayer agrees to pay a growth factor equal to
the exchange partner's outstanding balance, the transaction should
still qualify for like-kind exchange treatment.
H. The Depreciation Issue
When discussing reverse exchanges, the issue of depreciation
must be considered. There is some question as to how depreciation
should be handled while a taxpayer holds the relinquished property
and the replacement property simultaneously. 343 In considering the
proper treatment of depreciation, three time periods must be exam-
ined: (1) the period prior to the taxpayer's receiving the replacement
property, (2) the period during which the replacement property and
relinquished property are held simultaneously by the taxpayer (re-
ferred to as the gap period),344 and (3) the period following the tax-
payer's disposition of the relinquished property. There are no special
issues regarding the proper depreciation deduction for the relin-
341 602 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1979).
342 Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(k)-l(g)(5) (as amended in 1994).
343 See, e.g., Section of Taxation American Bar Association, supra note ABA
168 at 51 ("The taxpayer shall not be permitted to claim depreciation, amortization,
or other cost recovery deductions with respect to the adjusted basis of the relin-
quished property as of the date of acquisition of the replacement property from and
after the date on which the taxpayer receives the replacement property."); Sax,
supra note 169 (questioning whether freezing depreciation is the economically
correct result); Rev. Proc. 2000-37, 2000-40 I.R.B. 308 at § 3.03 (stating that the
revenue procedure does not address "whether an exchange accommodation title-
holder may be precluded from claiming depreciation deductions (e.g., as a dealer)
with respect to the relinquished property or the replacement property").
344 Sax, supra note 169.
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quished property prior to the taxpayer's receiving the replacement
property - the taxpayer should deduct its normal depreciation during
this period.
The most important period to consider is the gap period. Dur-
ing the gap period, the taxpayer who enters into one of the pure re-
verse exchanges listed above will own two properties simultaneously.
Since the replacement property is a continuation of the investment
the taxpayer had in the relinquished property, the taxpayer should not
be allowed to take a depreciation deduction in an amount other than
that which would be allowed for the relinquished property if the re-
placement property had not been acquired. Since the taxpayer does
indeed own an asset, however, the taxpayer should be able to treat
one of the assets as placed in service during the gap period. There-
fore, during the gap period, the taxpayer should be allowed a deduc-
tion for depreciation equal to the amount that would have been al-
lowed for the relinquished property had the taxpayer not entered into
a reverse exchange.
Upon disposition of the relinquished property, the replace-
ment property should be treated in the same manner as the replace-
ment property with respect to so much of the taxpayer's basis in the
replacement property as does not exceed the taxpayer's adjusted ba-
sis in the relinquished property. 345 If the taxpayer does receive boot
and recognize gain, the basis of the replacement property may differ
from the basis of the relinquished property.346 In such cases, the ex-
cess of the basis in the replacement property over the basis in the re-
linquished property should be treated as newly acquired property and
depreciated accordingly.347 The application of the depreciation rules
in this manner will produce a result that is consistent with both exist-
ing depreciation rules and the purposes behind allowing section 1031
exchange treatment.
The issue is no more complicated when a QEAA is used.
Since the taxpayer is deemed to enter into a simultaneous exchange
in a QEAA, the depreciation rules should be applied to the taxpayer
in the manner in which they are normally applied to simultaneous
345 I.R.S. Notice 2000-4, 2000-3 I.R.B. 313.
346 I.R.C. § 1031(d)(2001).
347 I.R.S. Notice 2000-4.
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like-kind exchanges. Although the subject of considerable conversa-
tion, the issue of depreciation in the context reverse exchanges or
parking arrangements is not terribly difficult to address.
IV. CONCLUSION
The discussion above shows that pure reverse exchanges can
be structured in such a manner that they satisfy the purposes Con-
gress had for enacting section 1031 and its predecessors. A taxpayer
who agrees in writing to transfer specific relinquished property to the
transferor of replacement property can show that the purpose of the
transfer was to continue the investment the taxpayer had in the relin-
quished property. If the taxpayer can complete the transaction prior
to the date the taxpayer is required to file a tax return, the transaction
will not result in administrative inconvenience, and will satisfy the
other purpose of section 1031.
Properly structured reverse exchanges also meet the exchange
requirement of section 1031. Two-party reverse exchanges, three-
comer reverse exchanges, and four-corner reverse exchanges all can
be structured in such a manner that the taxpayer receives property
from one party and transfers property to that same party. Structuring
a reverse exchange to occur in this manner will result in the transfer
satisfying both the property-for-property requirement and the recip-
rocal requirement.
Since properly structured reverse exchanges satisfy the pur-
pose of section 1031 and meet the exchange requirement of section
1031, such exchanges should be granted section 1031 exchange
treatment. Since taxpayers have no assurance that the Service will
not challenge properly structured reverse exchanges, taxpayers still
bear the risk that the Service will challenge such transactions. There-
fore, taxpayers may not be willing to enter into such transactions. To
help alleviate taxpayers' fears in this area, the Service should provide
guidance stating that they will not challenge the applicability of sec-
tion 1031 to reverse exchanges that are structured in the manner dis-
cussed above.

